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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate insider trades on Oslo Børs. More specifically, we explore the 
market reaction to insider trades, the abnormal returns earned by insiders in the long run, and 
finally we investigate whether outsiders can earn money by mimicking insider trades. Our 
analysis is conducted for the period 01.01.2010 – 26.09.2014. Using an event study 
approach, we document a strong initial market reaction to insider trades, particularly insider 
trades made by managers and directors, and insider trades in firms with recent financial 
distress. We also find some evidence of long term abnormal returns for insiders in certain 
firm categories, and for certain types of insiders. Finally, we develop an insider portfolio that 
outperforms the benchmark using standard performance measurements, but we do not find 
any significant alphas. We conclude that there are informational asymmetries between 
outsiders and insiders, and that the market does not hold strong-form efficiency. Our study 
has implications for those who seeking to earn abnormal returns by following insider based 
strategies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Insider trading have been an area of debate for a long-time and maybe even more so in 
recent years. Academics in economics and law have been debating the cost and benefit to 
society, and the research in the field is still ongoing. In the governmental- and political 
sphere the debate seems to be settled and insider trading is deemed as unbeneficial to 
society. In 1933, the U.S congress imposed regulations on insider trading with the Security 
and Exchange Act, and since then many countries have followed. Through the EEA 
agreement, the EU enforced the Insider Dealing Directive on their membership countries in 
1989, requiring membership countries to implement a set of minimum rules regarding 
insider trading. In 2002, the U.S regulations became stricter with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the EU followed with the Market Abuse Directive in 2003. These regulations take aim to 
reduce insiders’ ability to trade and profit from information that is not accessible to the 
public. The main idea is to create a more level playing field that leads to more confidence in 
fairness and integrity of the security markets. The essence of the existing regulation is to 
prohibit insiders from taking advantage of information that is both material and non-public. 
Material non-public information is defined as information that would likely affect prices 
significantly if made public.  
Insiders are still free to trade in their own companies, as long as they do not have access to 
material and non-public information. It is important to highlight this distinction as the 
difference between illegal- and legal insider trading may be confusing. Even though insiders 
are prevented from using material non-public information, it is still reasonable to assume that 
insiders have better knowledge about their business than what the market has. This 
informational asymmetry should in theory make insiders capable of better predicting future 
firm performance. Because of this, they should on average earn superior returns when 
compared to the market. Indeed, this is what most studies on international markets find, and 
in the present study, we will explore the long run abnormal returns1 made by insiders on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange.  
                                                
1 We define abnormal return as the difference between an assets’ actual return and the theoretical expected return, where the 
expected return is calculated using statistical models. Abnormal return can be both positive and negative relative to the 
expected return. 
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Further, if insiders indeed have better information than the average investor does, it implies 
that trades by insiders should convey additional information to the market. This means that if 
the market believes insiders to have superior information, we should expect to see reactions 
in the short-term market prices following insider trades. This study will therefore also 
examine the short-term behavior of market prices in firms with recent insider trades.  
Additionally, former studies have found large differences in the magnitude of abnormal 
returns following insider trades. Firm characteristics, volume of insider trades, and insider 
type are examples of factors that have been found to be related to the size of abnormal 
returns following insider trades. This study will further explore these relationships on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Many former studies have however questioned whether normal investors are able to make 
any abnormal profits by following insider trades. When accounting for transaction costs, 
most studies conclude that these strategies fail to capture any abnormal profits. Contrary to 
what most empirical research find, there are professional managed funds that claim that they 
beat the market by following insider strategies. In order to test whether it would be possible 
to outperform the market by following insider trades, we will develop a trading strategy that 
follows only the most profitable insider trades, and evaluate the performance of this strategy.  
Altogether, our methodology will also allow us to assess the market efficiency of Oslo Stock 
Exchange. If insiders indeed make abnormal profits, it will not be consistent with strong 
form efficiency, and if it is possible to beat the market by following insider trades, it will not 
be consistent with semi-strong efficiency.  
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2. Insider Trading 
2.1 Motives for insiders to trade 
From an insiders’ perspective, there are many potential motives to trade in their own 
company. In his empirical study Seyhun (1998) suggests it is essentially three reasons for 
insiders to trade; the profit motive, the liquidity motive, and the manipulation motive.  He 
further argues that motives for trading could be extrapolated from the pattern following 
insider trades.  
First, we have the profit motive. Insider trading indicates a misbelief in the market value and 
implies that insiders believe the firm’s fundamental value to be greater than the value 
reflected in the market. Thus, insiders trade to make a profit. Seyhun argues that if this were 
the case, one would observe insider purchases until the market value completely reflects the 
fundamental value of the firm. The same goes for selling. If the insiders believe the market 
value to be higher than the fundamental value, we would observe subsequent insider sales.  
The second motive is need for liquidity. When insiders sell for liquidity-needs, one should 
see no trading pattern.  
The last motive is manipulation of market prices. Manipulations of market prices occur when 
insiders buy or sell in an attempt to affect security prices. It could be that insiders sell a small 
amount of stocks in order to depress prices, so that they can buy a larger portion at a later 
time at a better price. If this is the case, one should find a reversal in the trading pattern.  
In his study, Seyhun does find evidence for the first motive, but no evidence for reversing 
patterns. One reason for the latter could be the extensive regulation on market manipulation. 
His findings suggest that insiders tend to trade on signals in the company, and insider trades 
should thus yield correct and credible signals to the market.  
There are also other potential reasons for insiders to trade. A motive for selling could be the 
diversification motive (Lee and Lakonishok, 2001). Because many companies uses options 
and stocks in their incentive programs, the proportion of investors wealth invested in their 
own firm can be sub-optimal. According to modern portfolio theory, undiversified investors 
can increase their expected returns without increasing risk by diversifying. At the same time, 
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placing savings in the company one works for induces a correlation between human wealth 
and financial wealth. If the company were to go bankrupt, the insider would lose both his job 
and his financial savings.  One reason to sell could therefore be to decrease this risk.  
Another possible reason on the buy side is the power motive. Insiders might want to increase 
their holdings in order to increase their voting power. This could especially be true for large 
investors, and for smaller firms. 
 
2.2 Introduction to insider laws 
Insider trading is defined as buying, or selling, stocks or other financial instruments, by 
anyone who has access to material, non-public information.  
However, there is a distinction between what is known as legal insider trading and illegal 
insider trading. For example, SEC defines illegal insider trading as buying or selling a 
security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in 
possession of material, non-public information about the security. 2 
The Norwegian laws on insider trading follow the EEA Agreement.3 This means regulation 
in Norway satisfies all the minimum regulation imposed by the EEA agreement. In addition 
to the EEA Agreement, Norway has imposed a set of stricter rules on insider trading. In the 
following, we will give a brief introduction to the existing laws in the EEA agreement, 
followed by a section that describes the insider laws specific to Norway. The reason for this 
is to give a clearer picture of how insider laws in Norway might lead to differences in 
abnormal returns when compared to other countries. 
 
 
 
                                                
2 http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm 
3 Agreement in the European Economic Area 
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EEA Agreement 
The EEA defines insider information as non-disclosed information of a precise nature 
relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable 
securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the transferable security. The key here is that the information would be likely to 
have a significant price impact if disclosed.  
The EAA defines transferable securities as: 
a) shares and debt securities, as well as equivalents to shares and debt securities; 
b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to in (a); 
c) futures contracts, options and financial instruments in respect of securities referred to 
in (a); 
d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a); 
 
Article 2 states that membership states shall prohibit persons possessing inside information 
from buying or selling securities from the issuer or issuers, with full knowledge of the facts. 
This inside information must be acquired through the virtue of membership of the 
management, administrative or supervisory body of the issuer, by the virtue of holding 
capital in the firm, or by the virtue of exercise of employment, profession or duties. Article 2 
further states that this applies to direct- and indirect trading, and to trading on the account of 
others.  
Article 3 states that any persons referred to in article 2 should be prohibited from disclosing 
insider information to any third party, unless in relation to normal course of exercise of his 
employment, profession or duties. In addition, article 3 prohibits persons referred to in article 
2 to give purchase or sell recommendations to third parties, based on the insider information.  
Article 4 states that prohibition should also be imposed on anyone who with full knowledge 
of the facts, possesses inside information acquired directly or indirectly through persons 
referred to in article 2.  
Article 6 is of particular interest to our study because it regulates disclosure rules. Article 6.1 
requires issuers to inform the public of any inside information as soon as possible. The issuer 
may however delay the public disclosure of inside information, to ensure no prejudice 
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towards his legitimate business interest, as long as such omission would not likely mislead 
the public.  
Article 6.3 states that issuers are required to draw up lists of people who work for them and 
that have access to inside information. These lists should be regularly updated and available 
on request.  
Article 6.4 states that persons discharging managerial responsibilities, or persons closely 
associated with them, shall notify the authorities of any transactions conducted on their own 
account, in the financial securities in the firm. Member states are then required to ensure that 
the public has access to this information as soon as possible. 
Even though the EEA Agreement gives quite specific guidelines to member states, the 
willingness and ability to pursue and regulate insider trading still differs across countries. In 
a study of insider trading laws in a small subset of developed countries, Stamp and Welsh 
(1996) reported the following: “In conclusion, it is clear that a number of jurisdictions are 
either not interested in, or are not prepared to devote the necessary resources to 
implementing their insider dealing legislation.”  
As mentioned, the countries under the EEA Agreement are free to adopt regulation that is 
more stringent. Many of the countries have blackout periods where insiders are not allowed 
to trade. These periods are often weeks or months prior to earnings reports. Some of the 
countries have regulations requiring insiders to investigate if the information they have is 
potentially price sensitive before they trade, and some countries requires insiders to ask 
permission from management before buying or selling.  
In addition, many of the countries have applied laws regarding the reporting duty of the 
insiders. These laws require insiders to report any positions and changes in the positions held 
to financial institutions. However, the time period that insiders are required to report within 
differs in many of the countries. In France, insiders are required to announce their insider 
dealings within two weeks of the trade taking place, while in Sweden, insider must report 
within 5 trading day. 
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Norwegian insider laws 
On average, the Nordic countries have stricter insider laws than the minimum rules imposed 
by the EEA directives, and Norway has been a leading nation in regards to insider 
regulation.  
In addition to the minimum rules imposed by the EEA, Norway has extended article 2 to 
include anyone who is in possession of insider information, not only insiders described in 
article 2. It is also extended to include all price sensitive information about all companies, 
not only information linked to the issuer. Norway also requires insiders to investigate 
whether there is any private information that could significantly alter the price of the 
company, and to ask for permission for trading from top management, before actually 
making any transaction. The law also prevents insiders from trading two months prior to 
annual reports, and one month prior to quarterly reports, effectively preventing trading for 
five months a year. This rule can however be ignored in certain circumstances, such as when 
the firm want to protect itself from a hostile takeover. Furthermore, Norway is one of the few 
countries where insiders are required to notify the authorities no later than the next trading 
day.  
It is especially the last rule that might affect the efficiency of the market. Because other 
countries allow insiders to wait for a longer period before publically announcing their trades, 
some of the information value might be lost. This suggests that the abnormal return earned 
by Norwegian insiders on the day of announcement might be larger than in countries with 
longer reporting window.  
 
Legal vs. Illegal Insider Trading 
Even though there is a sharp legal distinction between legal and illegal insider trades, the 
practical distinction is harder to define. For example, how to decide on what is a significant 
effect on prices. Another problem would then be how to measure the performance of the 
firm, conditioned on the event not taking place: in other words, measuring what the normal 
performance of the firm would have been if the event had not taken place. Another grey-area 
is whether many small effects should be viewed as one large impact. For example, if the 
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insider was aware of three smaller events that each could move prices by 1%, should this 
amount to 3%?  
As we can see, it is hard to monitor and make distinctions between legal and illegal insider 
trading. A fact that supports this notion is the low percentage of convictions on insider 
trading. For example, in 2013 Finanstilsynet investigated 72 trades on Oslo Stock Exchange, 
characterized as being suspicious. Out of these, only two resulted in charges being pressed. It 
is also worth mentioning that far from all charges results in convictions. Because the chance 
of being reported is so small, and conviction rate is even smaller, it would be naive to 
believe that all reported insider trades are strictly legal. Many of these trades are likely in a 
“grey-area” by the legal definition.  
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3. Theory 
3.1 Asymmetric Information 
In theory, the very reason why insiders might earn abnormal returns is their access to non-
public information. Access to such information gives insiders a superior position compared 
to ordinary investors, because they are better able to assess the current and future situation of 
the firm. Asymmetric information, expressed as the information-difference between insiders 
and the market, is therefore seen as the most essential factor behind abnormal insider returns.  
Asymmetric information is usually divided into two main aspects: moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
 
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard occurs when a party is willing to take on more risk because they are somewhat 
protected, wholly or partially, against the costs that might arise. The party acts differently 
compared to a scenario where they carry the whole risk themselves, because others will carry 
some of the burden. Such situation arises when someone deliberately retains relevant 
information to earn a, possible, personal profit. 
Moral hazard often occurs after a transaction taken place. Both parties might have access to 
the same information upon agreement (symmetric information). Once the transaction is 
completed one part might get incentives to act differently than prior to the agreement. In 
regards to insider trading, moral hazard is considered a problem related to short selling.  
As Carlton and Fischel (1982) points out, moral hazard could - in extreme scenarios - alter 
the way managers may act. The possibility that insiders may profit from bad information 
could make managers indifferent as to whether to make an effort to see the firm become 
successful or ruined.  
Carlton and Fischel also debate another way moral hazard may become a problem, as 
insiders has the possibility to unbundle or undo compensation schemes already agreed with 
the firm. By short-selling an equivalent amount of stocks insiders can undo the incentive 
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effects of a stock ownership plan. That way, insiders make themselves unaffected by how the 
firm performs – and evidently has no preference on whether to contribute or sabotage. 
 
Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is the other type of asymmetric information. Adverse selection occurs 
when information is deliberately retained before an agreement is reached. The reason to 
retain information is to improve one's own position.  
Asymmetrical information is the core of insider trading. Principles related to adverse 
selection are easily transferable to insider trading. For example, insiders with significant 
non-public information have a superior position and are more likely to strike a good deal 
compared to “ordinary” investors. Because of the - allegedly - superior information insiders 
possess, they can be said to have informational advantages over the counterparty, which 
would lead to informational asymmetries.  
Another way to benefit from asymmetric information is if insiders withhold themselves from 
trading. Insiders may deliberately avoid trading in their own company’s stock because they 
know that bad information is soon to be released. What if insiders delay their own trading 
until after such “bad news” is made public? The insider is still taking advantage of private 
and confidential information and, in theory, such behavior is just as harmful as trading on 
private and confidential “good news”. 
There are many factors likely to affect the size of the informational asymmetries. Analyst 
coverage and R&D expenditures are examples of firm specific factors that might affect the 
informational asymmetries.  Furthermore, the position of the insider is likely to affect their 
access to inside information. There have been extensive research on the subject, which will 
be investigated in our former research section. In our thesis we will compliment this research 
by exploring the relationship between factors leading to informational asymmetries, and 
insider abnormal returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
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3.2 Market efficiency 
Abnormal profits made by insiders can be used to gauge the efficiency of markets. The 
market efficiency can be described as how efficient the markets are in reflecting information. 
If it is somehow possible to make abnormal profits by using inside information, it means that 
this information is not reflected in the market prices.  
Eugene Fama wrote an article published in The Journal of Finance back in 1970, where he 
elaborated around a theory he called efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Fama explained his 
view on efficient markets and defined different “stages” of efficiency. 
EMH claims that stock prices, at any given time, reflect all known information about the 
asset. Under- and overvalued stocks do not exist because all investors have the exact same 
information. As a result, it is not possible for an investor to predict future changes in share 
prices and outperform the market. 
The theory assumes market participants to be rational in their expectations. The total sum of 
these expectations will reflect the average assumptions and estimate the “correct” market 
price. As new information continuously gets public, expectations need to be constantly 
revised. Some investors might exaggerate the new information and some may underestimate 
the information. Again, the important aspect in the theory is how the average investor 
behaves - the net effect on the market.  
Fama (1970) divided market efficiency into three main forms;  
Weak-form 
Weak-form efficiency claims that stock prices reflect all past publicly accessible information 
- mainly historical prices. In that case, it is not possible to make abnormal profits by 
analyzing historical price movements.  
Semi-strong 
If a market’s efficiency is semi-strong the prices reflect all public information. Prices would 
constantly change to implement new information. In the market holds semi-strong 
efficiency, it is not possible to outperform the market by trading on new information, as this 
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will already be reflected in the prices. Thus, fundamental analysis would not generate any 
new information and would be useless as a tool to earn abnormal return. 
Strong-form 
Strong-form efficiency incorporates both weak-form and semi-strong form, and additionally 
includes private information. So if markets are strong-form efficient, all historical prices, all 
public information, and all insider information are reflected in the stock prices. Strong-from 
efficiency thus makes it impossible to consistently beat the market, even for insiders.  
 
The EMH Response 
The EMH does not dismiss the possibility for market anomalies that result in abnormal 
profits.  In fact, market efficiency does not require prices to be equal to fair value all the 
times. Prices may be over- or undervalued only in random occurrences, so they eventually 
revert to their mean values. Because the deviations from a stock's fair price are in themselves 
random, investment strategies that result in beating the market cannot be consistent 
phenomena. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis argues that an investor cannot outperform the market based on 
information or skill. One would have to take on additional risk to beat the market. As gains 
and losses would be random, it would essentially depend on luck – or chance – whether one 
made a profit or not.  
 
Market Efficiency Related to Insider Trading 
If illegal insider trading does not generate any abnormal profits for the investors, it means 
the market efficiency holds a strong-form. It would mean that the stock prices already reflect 
all information related to the stock; both public and non-public.  
However, if insider trading does generate abnormal profit, it would prove that the stock 
prices do not reflect private information. Then the market is not of “strong-form” efficiency. 
In order to test whether the stock market holds a “semi-strong” form, we must test outsiders’ 
possibility to make profit based on insider trading. By this we mean that outsiders develop a 
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strategy where they buy securities based on published information on insider trades. If it is 
possible for outsiders to earn an abnormal profit by mimicking insider trades, it would mean 
the stock prices does not reflect all public information, and the stock market would not hold 
a “semi-strong” form.   On the other hand, if such a strategy fails to yield abnormal profit, it 
would seem the market prices reflect all relevant public information, and the market would 
hold a “semi-strong” form. 
 
3.3 Performance Measurement 
In order to adequately measure the performance of our insider portfolio, we need to use 
correct measurements of performance. Because our portfolio differs significantly in risk 
from well-diversified portfolio, it is essential to account for this when measuring 
performance. We will therefore briefly describe the theory on the subject.  
 
Risk 
Risk is generally divided into two categories: unsystematic risk and systematic risk (also 
called firm specific risk and market risk). Unsystematic risk is associated with the 
uncertainty that is related to a specific company or industry. These are risk that only affects a 
certain company or a certain industry. Examples of unsystematic risk would include new 
competitors, management change, or regulatory changes. The unsystematic risk can be 
reduced and even removed completely through diversification. By holding many stocks from 
many different industries, these risks are evened out. Going further, one can diversify even 
more by including different asset classes in one’s portfolio, such as bonds, property and 
commodities.  
Systematic risk is risk not related to any specific company. Systematic risk affects the 
overall markets, and is something that every company is exposed to in some extent. 
Examples of systematic risk can be different economic conditions, such as oil prices, interest 
rates, market expectations, etc. The investor must bear these risks no matter what.  
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Measuring Portfolio Performance 
When analyzing portfolio performance one needs to look beyond absolute returns. In order 
to get a more accurate assessment one must compare return relative to risk. It is also 
important to distinguish between different types of risk-estimates. Because unsystematic risk 
can be diversified away, it must be treated differently than systematic risk when assessing 
performance. Because of these differences in assessing risk, different performance 
measurements does not always provide unanimous answers to what portfolios or investments 
performed better. 
 
Risk differences 
To distinguish how well a portfolio performs one must define how to measure risk. Risk is 
mainly illustrated by either standard deviation or beta. 
A rule of thumb; standard deviation is the correct risk measure when the portfolio is one's 
only asset. The standard deviation does not distinguish unsystematic risk from systematic 
risk, and is a measure of the variances in the prices of the asset. When assessing performance 
by total risk, the Sharpe ratio and M2 are the most appropriate measures. It therefore follows 
that these measures are most appropriate when evaluating the performance of entire 
portfolios.   
The beta is a measure of the market risk of the asset or portfolio, and is thus the appropriate 
measure of risk when a portfolio is only one amongst many asset holdings. When measuring 
performance using systematic risk, the Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha are commonly used.  
Which parameter to emphasize is dependent upon the purpose of the portfolio; is the 
portfolio your only asset or part of a large portfolio consisting of multiple assets. 
It should also be mentioned that there are several different types of risk that are not 
accounted for using the standard deviation and beta measures, for example short-fall risks 
and recession risk. However, for the purpose of this master thesis we will not dive further 
into these.  
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Sharpe Ratio (SP) 
The Sharpe ratio is defined as an assets ratio between excess return and its standard 
deviation. Excess returns are defined as the returns of the asset, 𝑟!, minus the risk free 
returns, 𝑟!. Here the portfolios’ standard deviation, 𝜎!, reflects the total risk of the portfolio: 
 𝑆! =   𝑟! − 𝑟!𝜎!  (1) 
We thus see that the Sharpe ratio measures the excess return of the portfolio per unit of risk. 
Sharpe is often used to measure a portfolio that represents the investor's entire fortune.  
 
Modigliani and Modigliani (M2) 
The Modigliani measure, M2, compares a portfolios return to the benchmark’s risk, 𝜎!. M2 
can be seen as an interpretation of the differential return relative to the benchmark. 
M2 combines the portfolios risk with a risk-free alternative, making it possible to downscale 
the portfolio risk. M2  therefore enables the possibility to compare a portfolio’s returns to the 
returns of a benchmark, based on the same level of risk.  
Put in other words; M2 is equivalent to the returns a portfolio would have earned if it had the 
same amount of risk as its benchmark. Similar to the Sharpe-ratio, the asset with the highest 
measure of M2 will have the highest profits for all risk levels. 
 𝑀! =   𝜎!(𝑆! − 𝑆!) (2) 
M2 is based on Sharpe-ratio and, subsequently, ranks different portfolios in the same order as 
the Sharpe-ratio would. 
 
Beta (β) 
The fact that Sharpe-ratio and M2 does not take into account correlations between portfolios 
makes them less attractive for investors who are to choose several portfolios, or to add an 
asset to an already existing portfolio. 
 21 
The main difference between the previous and the following performance measurements is 
the type of risk assessed. Beta-values estimate the systematic risk of stocks and portfolios. In 
other words, beta measures the tendency of a security’s returns to respond to swings in the 
market. A beta of one indicates that the returns of the security will move with the market, a 
beta greater than one indicates that the returns will be more volatile than the market and a 
beta in between null and one indicates that the returns will be less volatile than the market. 
Negative betas indicate that returns of a security moves in opposite direction of the market.  
 
The Treynor Ratio (T) 
The Treynor-ratio is defined as the portfolio’s excess return relative to the portfolio’s 
systematic risk,  𝛽!. 
 𝑇! =   𝑟! − 𝑟!𝛽!    (3) 
The Treynor-ratio expresses risk premium per unit of systematic risk – and not total risk as 
previous ratios. The Treynor-ratio disregards return earned based on unsystematic risk, as it 
is possible to “average out” such risk through diversification. It is an appropriate 
performance measure when the asset is part of a larger, well-diversified investment portfolio.  
Like M2, Treynor’s ratio is in percentages. If you subtract the markets excess return from 
Treynor-ratio, you will obtain The Adjusted Treynor (T*).  
 𝑇!∗ =   𝛼!𝛽!  (4) 
The adjusted Treynor-ratio tells us how the abnormal return, 𝛼!, correlates to the portfolios’ 
systematic risk. How to calculate 𝛼! in the following section: 
 
Jensen’s alpha (α) 
Jensen’s alpha is a risk-adjusted measure of performance that shows the return on a portfolio 
beyond the theoretical expected return - forecasted by the CAPM. It bases its estimate on 
portfolio's beta and the average return of its benchmark. 
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   𝛼! =    (𝑟! − 𝑟!)− 𝛽!(𝑟! − 𝑟!) (5) 
Jensen’s alpha can be seen as the portfolios return that are not being explained through the 
portfolios relationship with the market. It is used as a measure of portfolio managers’ skill to 
produce abnormal returns.  
 
Appraisal-Ratio (AR) 
 𝐴𝑅! =    𝛼!𝜎(𝜀!) (6) 
 
By selecting a basket of investments, the manager of an active investment portfolio attempt 
to outperform the returns of a related benchmark. The appraisal-ratio measures a manager’s 
performance by comparing the return of their stock picks to the residual risk, 𝜎(𝜀!), of those 
selections. The higher the ratio, the better the performance of the manager in question. 
The appraisal-ratio is a measure of abnormal return per unit of firm-specific risk that could 
be diversified away by holding a market index portfolio. In our case, the appraisal-ratio is an 
indicator on how well our strategy generates excess returns through active trading.  
 
Information-Ratio (IR) 
 𝐼𝑅! =    𝑅! − 𝑅!𝜎(𝑅! − 𝑅!) (7) 
As with the appraisal-ratio, the information-ratio measures portfolio managers’ ability to 
produce excess returns relative to a benchmark. In equation (7), Ri represents returns 
adjusted for risk-free rate; 𝑟! − 𝑟!.  
Opposed to the appraisal ratio, the information-ratio is able to detect consistency in returns. 
In other words, the IR-measure will recognize if a manager has performed slightly better 
than the benchmark for a long period of time, or done significantly better for a few periods.  
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IR compares a portfolio returns above its benchmark’ returns to the tracking error. Tracking 
error is being estimated as the standard deviation of the difference between returns of a 
portfolio and returns of the imitated benchmark. Positive information-ratios indicate 
consistency in returns and outperformance of the market. On should however not that 
because the IR does not take systematic risk into consideration, it is unfit for ranking 
purposes. 
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4. Introduction to existing literature 
According to Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003), the research on insider trading have 
generally had three different motives; policy motive, scientific motive, and profit motive. 
The policy motivated research takes aim to determine the effectiveness of insider trading 
rules, and to decide whether regulation is appropriate in respect to market performance and 
fairness. Scientific research use insider trading to test insiders’ ability to make profit, and 
thus test the efficiency of the markets. The profit motive is research attempting to develop 
the optimal trading strategies to profit from insider trading. 
 
4.1 Policy Motive 
Most regulatory bodies are in favour of regulation. In a comprehensive survey of insider 
trading regulations in every country that had a stock market at the end of 1998, Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) found that all of the 22 developed countries and four out of five of the 81 
emerging markets had laws regulating insider trading. However, one should be careful with 
concluding that the current laws exist only as a result of economic arguments. Some of the 
reason may be a result of public sentiment and internal power struggles among governmental 
agencies. According to Dooley (1980), the trend toward further prohibitions of insider 
trading in the security laws can be explained by how the SEC and other regulatory bodies 
benefit from it. Governmental agencies will generally try to enlarge their jurisdiction and 
enhance their prestige. This will allow its administrators to substantially increase their 
salaries, power and reputation by maximizing the size of their agency’s budgets. Because the 
public opinion is that insider trading is unjust, and because of the media coverage on 
insider’s prosecutions, an effective way of attracting political support for larger budgets 
would be to enforce a vigorous program on dealing with insider trading.  
The SEC argues that insider trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of the security markets, which leads to reduced liquidity and less efficient markets. 
They also argue that allowing insider trading can lead to bad incentives for management in 
regards to business decisions, because managers will have a greater incentive to boost short 
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term stock prices and thus their own profits. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance argues the 
same, and also adds that insider regulation should be regulated based on fairness principle. 
They also argue that Norwegian markets could be hurt if insider trading laws are not as good 
as in competing markets, because it would cause investors to withdraw capital.  
However, there have been arguments against regulation. In his 1966 book Insider trading 
and the Stock Market, Henry Manne stunned the corporate law academy by arguing against 
regulation. He argued that market efficiency would increase by allowing insider trading 
because insider trading effectively produces more facts about a company. Outsiders tend to 
trade on insider signals, moving stock prices to better reflect the new available information. 
This will benefit both the firm and society through more accurate pricing of securities.  
Manne further argued that insider trading can be used as an incentive scheme for 
management and corporate entrepreneurs to produce additional information of value for the 
firm. The empirical evidence of the first argument is mixed. Givoly and Palmon (1985) 
found that insider purchases had a strong effect on share prices. In another study Inci, Lu and 
Seyhun (2010) compares insider trades with comparable non-insider trades in the same 
company. They found that insider trades had a significant positive effect on intraday prices 
and volume traded. These studies indicate that insider trades signal new information, which 
gets incorporated by outsiders, thus moving prices towards the correct intrinsic value. In the 
event that markets immediately incorporates information from insider trades, the markets can 
be said to be more efficient because prices better reflect all available information.  
However, in a similar study with a smaller sample, Kabir and Vermaelen (1996) found no 
evidence indicating that insider trading moves prices significantly different than non-insider 
trading. Lee and Lakonishok (2001) found significant price changes in securities following 
insider trades in the long run, but not significant price changes in the short run. In the study 
mentioned above, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) found a significant decrease in equity cost 
of capital when a country experienced its first insider persecution. According to Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985), this suggests that liquidity providers, in markets with 
insider impunity, protect themselves against insider trading by increasing their sell price and 
decreasing their buy price. This would raise transaction costs, which in turn would induce 
stock traders to require a higher cost of capital. The significant decrease in cost of capital 
signals that the market feel better protected with a more rigorous enforcement of the insider 
regulation. This goes against the argument Manne (1966) made. According to Manne’s 
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theory shareholders would require a higher return to compensate for higher uncertainty, as 
regulations would lead to uncertain and more volatile prices.  
One should further note that all the mentioned studies investigate reported insider trades. As 
illegal insider trading is likely to be concealed, conclusions drawn from these studies may 
not cover all facts about the price and volume effect from illegal insider trading.  
The mixed empirical evidence makes it hard to make any claim about whether insider 
regulation leads to more efficient markets.  
In regards to the second point, Bainbridge (1996) contends that insider trading is a poor 
incentive scheme. He argues that it is hard to assert the true value of the insider trading in 
advance, and that it will depend on the existing wealth of the insiders. Insiders with little 
capital to invest would not be able to trade on their superior information. He also argues that 
it may introduce perverse incentives for managers. If managers are allowed to short sell or 
sell their stocks, the managers are in effect rewarded from poor performance. 
Another argument against regulation is that insider trading is a victimless offence, and that 
enforcing trading prohibitions is not cost-effective. Indeed, the investor selling would sell 
anyway and it is just by coincidence that the investor on the other side of the trade is an 
insider. Interestingly, Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) found that, on average, outsiders 
only lose 10 cents on a 10,000 dollar sale when an insider is on the other side. However, in 
the option market the option writer might still face significant losses. One must also take 
care to include the external costs resulting from the perception that insider trading is 
unchecked. If investors perceive that insider trading hurts them, they might be more reluctant 
to trade, which would hurt market liquidity.  It could also be argued that insiders are more 
representative in other markets than the US because of more concentrated ownership 
structures and less foreign investors, something that would increase the loss for outsiders.  
In favor of regulation, Bainbridge (1996) considers the increased incentive for manipulation, 
the reputational effects on the firm, and interference with corporate plans. By allowing 
insider trading, managers will have a larger incentive to use accruals in an attempt to affect 
share prices, and this will harm both the firm and society through less accurate pricing.  
 27 
The firm might also be hurt if investors demand a premium when trading in stocks where 
insider trading is known to take place, because it would raise the cost of capital, making 
financing more expensive.  
Finally, if insiders were allowed to trade unregulated, it could interfere with corporate plans 
because it would make them more visible. If several insiders would trade in a potential 
takeover target, it could make the planned acquisition more visible, which could results in 
competing bids or defensive strategies. This would thus hurt the firm by making the 
acquisition more expensive. However, going through the existing research on the subject, 
Bainbridge only found mixed evidence to support his arguments. Instead, Bainbridge argues 
that the most compelling reason for regulation is that insider trading can be thought of as 
theft of property rights in information. Bainbridge argues that firms should be the one 
profiting from information value and not the insider. Allowing insider trading would hurt 
firms’ incentive to produce socially valuable information, because it would be the insiders 
and not the firms who profit from such information.  
 
4.2 Scientific Motive 
Over the history, there have been numerous of studies conducted to test different aspects of 
market efficiency. The early studies attempted to see whether portfolios of stocks picked on 
insider criteria would outperform the market. Most of these studies concluded that insider 
portfolios beat the market. Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) builds on the works of Glass 
(1966) and Rogoff (1966), and found that US stocks with recent insider activity beat the 
market for six months following extensive insider trading. This is something that suggests 
that insiders have predictive power of future firm performance.  Lorie and Niederhoffer are 
however careful to mention that there is large uncertainty around the date and price of the 
insider trades, which could bias the results. Using another methodology than the traditional 
event studies, Eckbo and Smith (1998) investigates the performance of insider trades on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1985-1992. Their rationale for using a different model is 
that the traditional model does not give a correct picture on actual holding period of insiders, 
because traditional studies estimate abnormal returns in a pre-specified period following 
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insider trades. Contrary to most other studies, they find no evidence of abnormal returns for 
the insider portfolios. 
Building on the early works, other studies sought to test whether the market adjusted profit 
of the insider portfolios beat the market. If the insider portfolios that beat the market 
consisted of more market sensitive stocks, it would still not be a breach of the strong form. 
Finnerty (1976) used an event-based methodology similar to Rogoff and Glass, but he uses 
different criteria when choosing insider stocks. He found that insider portfolios seemed to 
earn market adjusted abnormal profit, suggesting that markets are not strong-form-efficient. 
Jaffe (1974) came to the same conclusion.  
At this time, studies started questioning the validity of the CAPM model. Banz (1981) 
documented that shares in smaller firms earned higher returns than shares in larger firms. 
Basu (1983) provided evidence that shares with high earning yields (low price-to-earnings 
ratios) on average experienced higher returns than firms with low earning yields. Similarly, 
Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) provided evidence that shares with low price-to-book 
ratios (value firms) earned higher subsequent returns than firms with high price-to-book 
ratios (growth firms). If the CAPM model is correct, all these studies provide evidence of 
market anomalies. Alternatively, it could be that the CAPM inefficiently captures the 
relationship between risk-reward, and that these firm characteristics were rather associated 
with different levels of risk. Taking this into consideration, many studies attempted to 
account for such characteristics when calculating the abnormal returns. In fact, it was 
established that a large fraction of the abnormal return insiders earned stemmed from small 
stocks and value investing. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) accounted for these 
characteristics by using two different approaches. They used the four-factor model of 
Carhart (1997), and found that size, momentum and value factors accounted for about one 
quarter of the abnormal returns found using the CAPM. Using the characteristic-selectivity 
method developed by Daniel et al. (1997), they found the same results. Monthly abnormal 
returns using the CAPM were found to be 0.68% and 0.52% using the four-factor model. 
Lee and Lakonishok (2002) came to the same conclusion. They constructed a hedge portfolio 
where they went long in stocks with the highest net insider purchase, and short in stocks with 
the lowest net insider purchase, based on the last 6 months of trading. They found the spread 
between the two portfolios to be 7.7% during the first year, and only 4.8% when adjusting 
for size and B/M. In effect, these adjusted returns give a better representation of the 
abnormal returns resulting from “insider” content only.  
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At the same time, studies began to examine the sources of abnormal insider returns. Since 
insider returns stem from information asymmetries between the insiders and the outsiders, it 
was hypothesized that insider returns ware related to the magnitude of asymmetries. In the 
same study Lee and Lakonishok argue that the information asymmetry in small stocks is 
greater than in large stocks, and that this likely is the reason for the difference in returns. In 
other words, efficiency in large stocks is greater than in small stocks because of greater 
scrutiny and more analyst coverage. As a result, insiders who work in small-stock companies 
are more likely to profit from such comparative information. The scrutiny might also lead 
the larger companies to put more effort into discouraging illegal insider trading. Indeed, 
most studies find evidence for some sort of small firm effect. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser 
found small-cap firms to yield an average additional significant abnormal monthly return in 
the range of 0.3%-0.5%. The same study found no evidence of abnormal return for the mid- 
and large cap firms. In their hedging portfolio, Lakonishok and Lee found that small-cap 
stocks yielded an abnormal spread of 4%. They also found a spread of 2.2% in the mid-cap 
portfolio, but no difference in the large cap portfolio. 
When looking at the book-to-market value (BM ratio), Lakonishok and Lee found an 
interesting relationship. They decomposed the insider portfolios into nine groups based on 
size and BM. They found that, when comparing across the BM groups, the insider buy and 
sell signals did not show any major differences in abnormal returns. However, the insider 
trades indicated a large difference in the segment consisting of small stocks with a low BM 
ratio. This segment consist of small growth stocks, often technology-companies in a starting 
phase, which are generally hard to value, making inside information extra valuable. These 
firms often also have high research-and-development spending. Because firms tend to give 
little information on how the R&D costs are utilized, the insiders’ advantage should be larger 
in R&D intensive firms. Investigating this, Aboody and Lev found insider abnormal returns 
in R&D-intensive firms to be 2% higher than abnormal returns following insider trades in 
non-R&D intensive firms.  
Further investigating the informational asymmetry hypothesis, studies have been conducted 
to investigate the relationship between abnormal returns and investor’s position within a 
firm. The idea is that higher-positioned insiders have greater access to “inside information”. 
However, another possible effect is that top management is under greater scrutiny and 
behaves in a more careful manner because of this. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) 
divided their insider portfolio into the following categories; top-executives, directors, and 
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managers. They found that all earned significant abnormal return. However, they found no 
significant differences between the groups. Lakonishok and Lee divided insiders into “large 
shareholder” and “managers”. They found no support of predicting power for large 
shareholders, but they did find evidence of significant predicting power from managers’ 
trading. Lakonishok and Lee speculate that the reason for this is that large shareholders are 
removed from the decision-making process of the firm, and have less ability to affect stock 
prices.  
The relationship between trade-volume and insider returns has also been heavily debated. 
One might expect high-volume trades to reflect a stronger belief in a firm’s future 
performance, as well as being more credible. If this is the case, high-volume trades should 
convey stronger positive signals to the market. Other theories, like the Stealth Trading 
Hypothesis developed by Barclay and Warner (1993), claim that insiders may try to suppress 
their information by not trading in large quantity. They further argue that because transaction 
costs diminishes the profits from several smaller trades, mid-sized trades send the strongest 
signal.  
Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) investigated trading volumes’ relationship to insider 
trades by dividing all trades into three sizes (Small-, Mid- and Large trades). Their findings 
imply a statistically significant positive correlation between trade-volume and short-term 
returns. Their results also indicated the same relationship in for long-term abnormal returns, 
but the difference in abnormal returns between mid- and large-volume trades return were no 
longer significantly different. 
Another thing that could affect strength and credibility of insider trades is the financial 
position of the firm. According to Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006), the idea is that 
insider trades in firms with financial distress and insolvency problems should yield extra 
strong signals. Indeed they did find evidence that insider purchases were followed by 
substantially higher abnormal returns in firms that were in financial distress.  
Another interesting thing to look at is whether the insider transactions are purchases or sales. 
The majority of previous studies find that insider purchases leads to both economical and 
statistically more significant abnormal returns than insider sales. Lakonishok and Lee (2002) 
argue that there are a variety of reasons for insiders to sell – whereas almost all insider 
purchases are motivated by profits. Of course, insiders are likely to sell their shares if they 
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believe firms to be overvalued and expect the stock price to decline. Nevertheless, insiders 
might sell their shares for totally different reasons as well. Insiders might want to diversify, 
or they may simply want to free up capital.  
More recent studies attempt to explore intraday insider returns. As mentioned, earlier 
findings have been mixed regarding short-term abnormal returns. However, more recent 
studies with access to more accurate price data seem to find strong evidence for intraday 
price changes. Inci, Lu and Seyhun (2010) provide evidence that suggest insider trading 
contributes to the informational efficiency of the stock market. They found that after insider 
purchases, prices on average rose 1% on the trade following the insider transaction, and then 
continued to rise by 0.5% throughout the rest of the day. Insider sales also had a significant 
immediate price impact, but by the end of the day prices tended to revert. These findings also 
suggest that insiders are contrarian. Insiders purchase stocks when prices are at their lowest 
point during the day, and sell stocks when prices are at the top. Insiders also seem able to 
buy and sell at the lowest points during a 61-day window. Additionally, Seyhun et al. found 
evidence indicating that price changes after insider trades are caused by the markets reaction 
to insider trading, and not by the insiders themselves. Trade-volume in the 5 minutes 
following an insider trade increases significantly. These finds suggests some professional 
market participants are able to discover insider trades before they are made public. 
In their study, Lin and Rozeff (1995) used a different model when testing for short term 
abnormal returns. However they also found evidence that information from insider trades are 
incorporated quickly into prices. They find that 85-88% of the private information the 
informed trader has at the beginning of the day is incorporated into prices by the end of the 
day.  
There have also been studies looking at cross-country differences in abnormal returns 
following insider trading. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) found abnormal returns 
over a five-day window to be 3 times larger in the UK compared to the US. They argued that 
difference arises as insider trades, at that time, had to be made public within 6 business days 
in the UK, compared to 40 days in the US. They also point out the fact that the UK insiders 
by law comprise a much smaller and more informed group, and that the UK operated with a 
trading ban during price-sensitive periods. Both these factors would suggest that insider 
trades in the UK were more informative. This is interesting in relation to our study because 
the Norwegian insider laws are more similar to the UK. 
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In their 2010 study, Fidrmuc, Korczak and Korczak looks at abnormal returns following 
insider trades in the US and 16 different EU countries. Controlling for factors that have been 
found to affect abnormal returns, they found that differences in shareholder protection 
contributed to large differences in abnormal. Using the Anti-Self-Dealing index (ASD Index) 
developed by Djankov et al. (2008), which is a numerical measurement of legal protection of 
minority shareholders, Fidrmuc et al. divided the countries into high level and low level by 
creating a dummy variable for countries scoring above the cross-section median. Their 
findings suggest differences in cumulative abnormal returns to be 1.7% in a five-day 
window, and 8.4% in a 100-day window. Fidrmuc et al. (2010) argue that insider actions are 
more transparent, credible and trustworthy in countries with a higher level of shareholder 
protection, and that this leads to stronger and more precise signals. Insiders are less able to 
extract private benefits of control in countries with high shareholder protection, and hence, 
less of the firm-value increased through insider trading is diverted into private pockets.  
In sum, there is considerable evidence indicating insiders are able to outperform the market. 
This would not be consistent with strong-form market efficiency. However, by defining 
strong-form efficiency as a condition where prices rapidly reflect private information that is 
traded upon, Lin and Rozeff (1995) argues that evidence suggests that markets are strong-
form efficient. Even though most of the studies have found evidence of insiders 
outperforming outsiders, they are all sceptical about whether it will be possible for outsiders 
to earn abnormal returns based on mimicking insiders. Because of this, the majority of 
insider studies conclude that there is no breach of the semi-strong market efficiency 
hypothesis. Lakonishok et al. argues that most of the abnormal returns comes from insider 
trading in small, illiquid stocks. Because trading in these stocks are considered to be more 
costly, they find it hard to believe it is possible for outsiders to make abnormal profit. 
Evidence of large intraday price changes also indicates the market is at least semi-strong 
efficient. However, there are at least two things to take into consideration. One is that these 
studies do not in a large degree attempt to create an optimal trading strategy based on the 
most profitable insider trades. It could be that there is a way to trade on only specific insider 
trades with extra strong signals, and make money from this. This is what the for-profit 
literature tries to investigate. Another point to be made is that transaction costs have declined 
over the years. This could make previously non-profitable strategies become profitable 
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4.3 Profit Motive 
The research on outsider abnormal returns can be divided into two; the research done 
through a scientific framework, and research done in the for-profit literature. Even though 
most studies conclude that insiders tend to earn abnormal profits, there is larger uncertainty 
about whether outsiders are able to profit from trading on insider news. However, Gelband 
(2005) criticizes most of the earlier studies. Gelband argues that other studies have only 
looked at aggregate insider trading. Gelband claims that in order to test the possibility for 
outsiders to earn abnormal profits, one should use strategies mimicking only the most 
profitable trades. Gelband also criticizes the fact that these studies often focus on both policy 
and science. According to Gelband, the consequence of such an approach is that these 
studies strives to isolate the “insider” content of information in order to answer policy 
questions, and that this is a wrong approach to test for the semi-strong form of the EMH. 
In his paper, Gelband analyzed an outsider’s possibility to profit by adjusting for the factors 
mentioned above. He conducted the study both before and after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley law in the United Sates in 2002. Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act insider 
trading could take as long as 40 days to become public, whilst after implementation of the 
act most insider trades became public within two days.  
Gelband constructed six experimental groups mimicking insider trades and two control 
portfolios of similar stocks, but not including insider trading. In his insider portfolio, he 
bought stock with strong signals and held them for 3-6 months. He also used a signal 
multiplier to decide how active and aggressive the portfolios were allowed to be.  
Trading in only small stocks with high R&D costs with 3 months investments and assuming 
transaction costs to be 40 basis points, he found that prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley act the 
insider portfolios earned a 2.8 % abnormal return, but it was not statistically significant. 
However, in the 17 months after the introduction of the act, his most profitable portfolio 
earned 17.7% abnormal return after transaction costs. Interestingly, in the next 12 months, 
the abnormal return disappeared. This suggests that it was at least a momentary breach of the 
semi-strong EMH. Consequently, markets need time to price in new information. The fact 
that investors are constantly trying to beat the market, and such opportunities being 
arbitraged away, makes the market more-or-less efficient in the long run. 
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5. Our approach 
 
Our thesis will have both a scientific motive and a profit motive. First we will investigate 
whether Norwegian insiders earn abnormal profit by looking at firm performance in firms 
with recent insider trading. We will look at both short term and long term abnormal returns. 
We will use our result from the short term abnormal returns to determine whether insider 
trades provides the markets with additional information, and thus makes the markets more 
effective. We will use the long run returns to help us determine if insiders are better able to 
predict future firm performance than outsiders. In addition to this, we will further investigate 
whether factors such as market cap, price/book-ratios, insider type and trade size yields 
different abnormal returns.   
Building on our results, we will take a profit approach and build a portfolio based on simple 
trading rules, and attempt to see whether our portfolio will beat the market.  
In regards to the former published studies on Norway, our thesis stands out in a couple of 
aspects. To our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to control for firm specific 
factors such as price/book-ratios and size. We also have access to better data related to trade 
volumes, so that we are able to better control for insider wealth. Moreover, this study will be 
the first study on Norway to take the profit approach. Former studies have only been 
attempted to find abnormal profit earned by insiders, it has never been attempted to make 
trading-strategies based on only the most profitable insider trades.  
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6. Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we will formulize the hypotheses we want to test.  
It is realistic to assume that employees, managers, etc. have better knowledge and 
information about “their” firm than outsiders. If this is the case, insiders should on average 
be able to predict future performance better than outsiders should. If insiders know for a fact 
that their firm’s intrinsic value differ from market expectations, insiders will be able to earn 
abnormal profits. This is in effect what we are trying to determine with our first hypothesis. 
When investigating this, we examine firm cumulative abnormal returns for 1, 3 and 6 
months following insider trades.  
H1: Does insiders on Oslo Stock Exchange on average earn abnormal profit in the a) 1, b) 
3 and c) 6 months following insider purchases? 
 
Earlier research has found that insider purchases tend to provide stronger signals to the 
market than insider sales. As mentioned, this is likely because insider have more motives 
beside the profit motive to sell their stocks. With this hypothesis, we aim to explore the 
relationship between insider sales and abnormal returns. However, because most of the 
earlier research on the subject have found abnormal returns following insider sales to be less 
significant than returns following purchases, and because of fewer observations, we will 
restrict ourselves to only analyze returns in a one-month window.  
H2: Does insider sales affect abnormal returns in the month following insider sales? 
 
Former research has revealed some interesting relationships between firm characteristics and 
abnormal returns earned by insiders. It especially seems like the abnormal returns earned by 
insiders are dependent on the level of informational asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders. Firm characteristics like size and P/B-ratios could relate to the information 
asymmetry. Smaller firms are under less scrutiny and are less monitored by financial 
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analysts, which would lead to greater information asymmetry. Likewise, growth firms with 
high P/B-ratios are hard to value because a lot of the value lies in the long-term future 
performance. Thus, more recent and accurate information should be more important, and 
allow insiders to earn higher abnormal returns.  
H3: Does book-to-market ratios and firm size affect the abnormal returns earned by 
insiders? 
 
It has also been discovered that insiders’ position within the firm seems to affect the size of 
the abnormal returns earned. As with firm characteristics, the main idea is that an insider’s 
position within the firm is likely affect the size of the informational asymmetries. Insiders 
with high positions within the firm should have more and better information than insiders in 
lower positions. We have however seen in former studies that this relationship does not 
always hold, and that there might be other factors in play. With this hypothesis, we will 
attempt to discover if there are any significant relationships between abnormal returns and 
insider type. 
H4: Do different types of insiders earn different abnormal return? 
 
Another factor that could affect the abnormal returns is the size of insider trades. The idea is 
that insiders’ confidence regarding their company correlates with their willingness to invest. 
Following this logic, we would expect to see that larger trades yield larger abnormal returns. 
However, because there are huge differences in the wealth of insiders, absolute trade size 
might be misguiding. We will therefore test this hypothesis using both absolute trade size 
and a relative trade size.  
H5: Does the size of insider trades affect abnormal returns? 
 
Following the study of Inci, Lu and Seyhun (2010), we are interested in investigating 
whether there are any significant abnormal returns on the trading day prior to the actual 
announcement of the insider trades. If this is indeed the case, it would mean that some 
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market participants are able to see when insiders trade, and to act on it. This again would 
have relevance for others trying to capture abnormal returns following the announcement of 
insider trades, because some of the information value will already have been traded away.  
H6: Is there any abnormal return on the day prior to the announcement of insider trades? 
 
If the market believes insiders possess superior knowledge, the market subsequently assumes 
insider trades generate new information. Assuming insider trades do generate new 
information, we expect short-term market prices to adjust to any new information. Given 
these assumptions, insider trades will make markets more efficient as the new prices better 
reflect the true value of firms. Any immediate abnormal returns will also imply that the 
market is not strong for efficient, because insider information should already be priced into 
the securities. We will also investigate whether the market takes into account the size of the 
likely informational asymmetries, and how credible the signals are. We will test whether this 
is the case by measuring and testing cumulative abnormal return on the day of the 
announcement and the day following the announcement (0, 1]. Similar to Fidermuc et. al. 
(2006) we will then perform a cross-section multiple regression analysis on the abnormal 
returns to find the source of the abnormal returns.  
H7: Does insider trades provide the markets with new information? 
 
In later years, there have been investment funds claiming to have outperformed the market 
by following insider strategies. Likewise, the Norwegian financial newspaper Finansavisen 
has claimed that their insider portfolio has beaten the market 12 out of the last 13 years. The 
logic behind such strategies is straightforward; if insiders indeed earn abnormal profits, it 
could be possible to earn abnormal returns by constructing a strategy based on mimicking 
insider trades. We will therefore test this hypothesis by developing a trading strategy based 
on the results found answering the above hypotheses.  
 H8: Is it possible to earn abnormal profits by following a strategy based on insider 
purchases? 
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7. Methodology  
 
There are many different approaches when measuring abnormal returns. The choice of 
method will depend on the question at hand. Generally, intensive criteria and event-based 
methods will be used when determining how informative insider trading is for future returns. 
In other words, these methods are appropriate when trying to find out if outsiders can earn 
abnormal returns. The intensive criteria method used by Lee and Lakonishok (2002), have 
two distinctive features. First, it uses a portfolio approach where it analyses average 
abnormal returns across firms rather than trades. Secondly, the method uses a filter-rule 
defined over monthly or longer periods to assign firms into portfolios, which means that 
firms are only reclassified after each period.  
The intensity criteria method might lead to some drawbacks. The first feature means that it 
will be impossible to determine the value-weighted return to all trades because the stocks 
with intensive trading may constitute a large or a small part of all insider-trading. Second, 
because stocks are chosen based on insider trading over a longer period, some abnormal 
profit might be lost because the immediate abnormal returns are not included. Third, because 
the intensity method uses a specific filter rule that is chosen subjectively, it can lead to data-
snooping bias.  
In regards to determining the ability for outsiders to make profit, the first and the last 
drawback are not really a problem. Since the method makes it impossible to conduct 
transactions as soon as the insider trades takes place, some of the abnormal short-term profit 
may be lost. Despite this, such an approach would be viable if one wishes to make a large-
scale strategy based on insider trading, because it allows for simple rules to trade on.  
Event based methods takes account for the second drawback. Event-based methods make it 
possible to detect immediate abnormal returns following insider trades. However, the 
problem with event-based methods is that they face statistical difficulties due to cross-
sectional correlation across trades, and that they induce biases in computing long-run 
abnormal returns (1-5 years). 4 
                                                
4 Barber and Lyon (1997) 
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Another common approach is the portfolio-mimicking method used by Jeng, Metrick and 
Zeckhauser (2003). With this method, all firms with insider trades are placed in a value-
weighted insider portfolio that acts like a shadow mutual fund. This method therefore 
represents better proxies for what insiders are able to earn on their own trades. By using this 
approach, one deals with the drawbacks of the previous mentioned methods. However, this 
method is not viable when looking at short term market returns because it is not possible to 
look at subsequent abnormal returns across trades.  
In our thesis, we primarily seek to answer two questions. First we will investigate whether 
insiders make abnormal returns, both in the short run, and in the long run. Second, we will 
be examining outsider’ possibility to make abnormal profit by following a strategy based on 
insider trades.  
In measuring short-term returns, we argue that the event based method will be most 
applicable because of its strengths in short term windows. We also argue that this method 
will be the most applicable in detecting the most profitable trades, because it allows us to 
better measure abnormal returns across different subsets. We will therefore implement the 
event-based method when analyzing abnormal returns. The weakness with the event based 
method is the statistical difficulties it faces when calculating abnormal returns over longer 
periods. Other empirical studies tend to use portfolio-mimicking methods when measuring 
abnormal returns over more than three months. In order to check the robustness of our long-
term results, we choose to supplement our 3- and 6- month’s event-method analysis with a 
portfolio-mimicking method, as well as supplementing our results with non-parametric test 
statistics. In order to eliminate any potential statistical biases when measuring abnormal 
returns made by our insider strategy, we also chose to implement the portfolio-mimicking 
method when performing analysis on our insider strategy.  
We implement all of our event studies using the statistical software program STATA, and in 
some instances we supplement the use of STATA with Microsoft Excel. 
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7.1 Event Studies 
We will use the same approach as described by MacKinlay (1997) when we calculate normal 
returns, abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). In general, event 
studies tries to measure the effect some specific events have on stock prices. Some examples 
of events include mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements and issues of new debt 
or equity. Event studies are thus effective when measuring how new information is 
interpreted by the public. In our thesis the event will be the insider trade, and the effect on 
the stock price will then be measured over different time intervals after the trade.  
When conducting an event study, there is generally a procedure to follow (MacKinlay 1997); 
1. The initial task will be to decide on the event of interest and to identify the period 
over which the security prices will be measured.  
2. Second, we need to determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm 
in the study.  
3. Third, we must decide on what method to use when calculating normal returns. 
4. Given the selection on normal performance model, we need to decide on the 
estimation window. This is the period prior to the event that we will base our 
calculations of normal returns on.  
5. Next, we will need to design the testing framework for abnormal returns, such as 
defining the null hypotheses and determining how to aggregate the individual firm 
abnormal returns. 
6. Finally, we will present the empirical results and comment on weaknesses with our 
research. 
 
In the following, we will use this list when presenting our method and choices.  
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7.2 Event of interest and event window 
The event of interest will be the actual insider trade when investigating abnormal returns 
earned by insiders, and the day of publication when looking at abnormal returns to outsiders.  
The event window will consist of the days and months following the insider trades. As this 
thesis is written in cooperation with Dovre Forvaltning, we will use the same time-periods as 
them when measuring abnormal returns. Abnormal return will be measured for 1, 3 and 6 
months following insider trades, and our event window will thus respectively consist of 20, 
60 and 120 trading days in addition to the announcement day. We will also investigate 
immediate market reactions by using a two-day event window. When measuring immediate 
price reactions, we will measure the abnormal returns in a two-day window, the day of the 
announcement and the subsequent trading day.  In some cases, announcements can be made 
after the closing time of the stock exchange. Because of this, any abnormal returns from the 
announcement effect will not show up before the next effective trading day. By including 
both days in the event window, we control for such factor.  
When measuring abnormal return to insiders, the event window will include the day of the 
actual trade, as this better reflects the abnormal return earned by insiders. When we measure 
abnormal returns for outsiders, we measure abnormal returns from the day of publication.  
This means that the event windows measured are (0, 1] (0, 20], (0, 60] and (0, 120].  
One of the benefits of using these estimation windows is that it allows us to measure firm 
performance in the months following insider trades. In that aspect, it gives us a better idea 
about the size of the information asymmetry than what immediate abnormal returns does. In 
other words, it will give us a better idea whether insiders are better able to predict future 
price movements.  
Another benefit is that it allows for a pragmatic approach when measuring outsiders’ ability 
to earn abnormal profit. One can easily implement strategies based on holding stocks for 
these periods, and it allows for less intensive trading.  
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Selection criteria’s for firms  
One major decision was whether to use all companies on Oslo Stock Exchange, i.e. the main 
exchange and Oslo Axess, or only firms on the main exchange. Firms trading on Oslo Axess 
are generally younger and smaller in size, and the argument for including them would be to 
give us more observations that would increase the precision and accuracy of our models. It 
would also be better to include these firms in our insider portfolio in the case that these 
earned larger abnormal returns following insider trades. However it could also lead to 
potential biases. Because the stocks on Axess are quite illiquid, it could make the calculated 
normal returns less accurate, which again would bias abnormal returns. The small correlation 
between the OSEBX5 index and the firms on Axess could further lead to biases for the same 
reason.  
We therefore decided on making models for both; one model for all firms and one for firms 
only listed on the main exchange. However, because of the potential biases arising from 
using firms listed on Oslo Axess, we will only present our results from using firms listed on 
the main exchange.  
Furthermore, because of data availability we only use trades in regular equity, as opposed to 
derivatives and bonds.  
Another choice we made was to measure abnormal returns in a normal period. With a normal 
period, we refer to a period where the markets are stable. The reasoning being that trading 
periods of extraordinary returns might lead to biases. This is because the period on which 
normal returns are based might differ from the period in which abnormal returns are 
calculated. In other words, we want the period in which the normal returns are calculated to 
be similar to the period in which abnormal returns are measured. This leads us to exclude 
any insider trades before 2010, as the financial crisis and the bounce-back period are phases 
with returns and volatility out of the ordinary.  
In order to estimate normal- and abnormal returns, we need price data from the 205 trading 
days prior to the insider trades, and data for the whole estimation window. 
                                                
5 OSEBX - Oslo Børs Benchmark Index: The main index on Oslo Stock Exchange. Revised semi-annually, consisting of a 
representative selection of all firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange. Currently consisting of the 52 most traded shares. 
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This leads us to exclude any insider trades undertaken in the 10 first months of 2010, and 
some insider trades in the latter part of 2014 where we don’t have data for the whole event 
window. Another type of insider trades excluded were those where the companies ceased to 
exist during the estimation windows. As this might induce survivorship bias, we will 
investigate this more thoroughly later in our thesis.   
 
7.3 Method for calculating normal returns 
The normal return is defined as the expected return the security would earn without the 
insider trade taking place. The abnormal return for time t is then calculated by taking the 
actual ex post return of the security i on time t, minus the expected normal return for the 
same asset in the same period. 
 𝐴𝑅!" =   𝑅!" − 𝐸 𝑅!"|𝑋!  (8) 
There are a number of different methods for modelling normal returns. Generally, these 
methods can be loosely categorized into two groups, either statistical or economic. The 
statistical models use statistical assumptions concerning the asset behaviour, and they are not 
dependent on any economic arguments. The economic models use assumptions concerning 
investors’ behaviour, as well as statistical assumptions. The economic model still needs to 
rely on statistical assumptions, so potential advantage of these models is the opportunity to 
calculate more precise measures of normal return using economic restrictions. Examples of 
economic models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT). The CAPM, due to Treynor (1962) Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and 
Mossin (1966), is an equilibrium model where the expected return of a given asset is 
determined by its covariance with the market portfolio and the risk free rate. The CAPM was 
commonly used in event studies in the 1970’s, but it has fallen out of favour in later years 
due to the discovery of deviations from the model. These deviations might affect the validity 
of results found using the CAPM, and because of this the market model has taken its place. 
The APT, developed by Ross (1976), is an asset pricing theory where the expected return of 
the asset is a linear combination of multiple risk factors. It therefore eliminates some of the 
biases the CAPM leads to. It has however been found that the most important factor in the 
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APT behaves like the market factor, so that the gain from using the APT over the market 
model is small. We chose to use a statistical model because of the arguments given above, 
and because this is widely used in similar studies. 
There are two common statistical methods for modelling normal returns, the market model 
and the constant mean return model. The constant mean return model assumes that the mean 
return of a security is constant throughout time. The market model assumes there is a linear 
relationship between returns of a security and the market return. The only assumption 
imposed in the models is that asset returns are normally distributed and errors are 
independently distributed throughout time. Although these assumptions are strict, in practice 
it does not lead to problems because empirically they are reasonable, and interference using 
the models has been found to be robust to deviations from the assumptions. In addition, it is 
easy to modify the statistical framework to account for heteroskedasiticity and 
autocorrelation. Even though the constant mean return model is very simple, it has been 
found to yield similar results to more sophisticated models, as shown by Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985). These findings make this model very viable when no pre-event window is 
available. However, because of our access to historical data, we will be employing a market 
model. A market model yields an improvement as it removes the portion of return related to 
the market’s return, which will cause less variance in the abnormal return. This again will 
decrease standard errors and allow for us to more easily make statistical interference.  
As mentioned earlier, we will follow MacKinlay’ (1997) approach. In the following we will 
go through the model and the process as described by MacKinlay. 
 
The market model 
The market model is linear in its specification, and for any security i, the market model is 
 𝑅!! =   𝛼! +   𝛽!"𝑅!" +   𝜀!" 𝐸 𝜀!" = 0    𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜀!" =   𝜎!!!  
(9) 
where 𝑅!" is the specific firm return in period t, and 𝑅!" is the market return in period t. 𝜀!" 
is the error term, and 𝜎!"! , 𝛽!" and 𝛼! are the parameters of the model. The error term is the 
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difference between the actual return and the normal return in the estimation window. 
Estimates of 𝛼! and 𝛽!" is found using ordinary least squares method (OLS), which is the 
best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE), given that the assumptions hold.  
 
The Multifactor Model 
The market model can also be considered a one-factor model. Factor models are motivated 
by reducing the variance in the abnormal returns by explaining more of the variance in the 
abnormal return. This could also eliminate potential biases stemming from spurious 
relationships. Based on earlier research we know that small firms and firms with low P/B-
ratios tend to have higher subsequent returns than large firms and firms with high P/B-ratios. 
If insiders on average tend to trade more in small firms than large firms, this could bias the 
measures to make it seem like insiders on average earn higher returns than what is the case. 
We will employ a three factor model based on the works of Fama and French. We will do so 
by including small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) factors when calculating 
normal returns in the estimation window. The SMB-factor will be generated by creating a 
portfolio of the 33% smallest firms and the 33% largest firms. We will then measure the 
daily returns for these portfolios, and create the SMB variable by subtracting the returns in 
the big portfolio from the returns in the small portfolio. We will use the same method when 
creating the HML factor. We will create portfolios based on the relative book-to-market 
value (BM). The BM-ratio is the inverse of the P/B ratio, so that firms with high P/B values 
(usually growth firms) have low BM values. The HML portfolio is then created by 
measuring the daily returns of the high BM-portfolio (value) and low BM-portfolio (growth), 
and subtracting the returns of the low BM portfolio from the returns of the high BM 
portfolio. The model used to measure abnormal returns would thus look like the following; 
 𝑅!" =   𝛼! +   𝛽!"𝑅!" + 𝛾!"𝑆𝑀𝐵! + 𝛿!"𝐻𝑀𝐿 +   𝜀!" 𝐸 𝜀!" = 0    𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜀!" =   𝜎!!!  
(10) 
The only difference from the Market Model being the inclusion of SMB- and HML-factors, 
and their parameters  𝛾 and 𝛿.  
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7.4 Estimation window and event day 
The estimation window is the time period prior to the event. It is important to choose an 
estimation window that is long enough to give an accurate picture of the volatility of the 
security, while still being relevant when the event occurs. Estimation windows that are too 
long run the risk of including crisis and structural changes that can give a wrong picture of 
normal returns. However, the window must be long enough to give a statistical significant 
picture of the normal periods. Peterson (1989) finds that event studies usually operate with 
event windows consisting of 100-300 trading days, and MacKinlay argues that it is optimal 
to use a window between 180 and 250 trading days. We therefore chose an estimation 
window of 200 trading days, which is a little less than one calendar year. We also chose to 
disregard the last 5 days of trading before the insider trades, in case insiders trade on news or 
events that could lead to abnormal returns. Including these days could potentially lead to 
biases on normal returns of the firm if this is the case. 
  
Figure 1: Time-horizon for our event studies. T=0 is the time of announcement for insider trades. The 
estimation window and the event window are also referred to as L1 and L2 respectively.  Note that T 
indicates trading days. Thereby, one month consists of 20 days additional to the announcement day, 
and so on. 
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7.5 Testing framework for abnormal returns 
Estimation of the market model 
As long as the abovementioned assumptions6 hold, OLS is both efficient and consistent. The 
OLS estimators of the market model parameters are the following: 
 
Beta, Gamma & Delta7 
 𝛽! =    𝑅!! − 𝑅!!!!!  !  !!!"# 𝑅!! −   𝑅!𝑅!! −   𝑅! !!!!!  !  !!!"#  (11) 
 𝛾! =    𝑅!! − 𝑅!!!!!  !  !!!"# 𝑆𝑀𝐵! −   𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵! −   𝑆𝑀𝐵 !!!!!  !  !!!"#  (12) 
     𝛿! =    𝑅!! − 𝑅!!!!!  !  !!!"# 𝐻𝑀𝐿! −   𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿! −   𝐻𝑀𝐿 !!!!!  !  !!!"#  (13) 
As specified earlier (9), we find the parameters 𝛽, 𝛾  and  𝛿 through an OLS-regression. The 
parameters indicate the level of exposure to different risks; 𝛽 represent the level of exposure 
to market-risk (11). 𝛾 represent the level of exposure to size-risk (12). 𝛿 represent the level 
of exposure to value-risk (13). 
 
Alpha 
Market Model 𝛼! =   𝜇! −   𝛽!𝜇! (14) 
                                                
6 Normally distributed returns and errors are independently distributed throughout time 
7 “ ^ “ above a parameter mean it is estimated, while “𝐴 “ above the parameter imply it is average. 
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Multifactor Model 
 
𝛼! =   𝜇! −   𝛽!𝜇! − 𝛾!𝑆𝑀𝐵! − 𝛿!𝐻𝑀𝐿! 
 
(15) 
 where 
𝜇! =    1𝐿!    𝑅!"!!!!!!!!"#  
(16) 
 
 
and 
𝜇! =    1𝐿!    𝑅!"!!!!!!!!"#  
 
(17) 
𝐿!is the length of the estimation window.8 From the OLS-method, 𝛼, represents the point on 
the y-axis where the linear regression intercepts. As earlier, the Multifactor Model accounts 
for the SMB- and HML-factors in addition to the factors included in the Market Model. 
 
Variance of the error term 
 
Market Model 𝜎!"! =    1𝐿! − 2 𝑅!" −   𝛼! −   𝛽!𝑅!" !!!!!!  !!!"#              (18) 
 
 
Multifactor Model 
 
𝜎!"! =    1𝐿! − 2 𝑅!" −   𝛼! −   𝛽!𝑅!"−  𝛾!𝑆𝑀𝐵! − 𝛿!𝐻𝑀𝐿! !!!!!!  !!!"#  
 
 
(19) 
After we have estimated the parameters in the model, we can calculate the normal return of 
firm i in the event window for every trade. The abnormal return is then found by subtracting 
the estimated normal return from the actual return in the event window.  
 
                                                
8 L1 is the period from T=-205 to T=-5, consisting of 200 trading days. 
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Abnormal return (AR) 
Given the parameter estimated from the models, one can calculate and analyze abnormal 
returns. When calculating abnormal returns the time parameter, t, will be within L2 – 
meaning returns will be measured in the event window9 and compared to the same assets’ 
returns in the estimation window. 
 
Market Model 
𝐴𝑅!" =   𝑅!" −   (𝛼! −   𝛽!𝑅!")  (20) 
 
Multifactor Model 
 
 𝐴𝑅!" =   𝑅!" −   (𝛼! −   𝛽!𝑅!" −   𝛾𝑆𝑀𝐵! − 𝛿𝐻𝑀𝐿!) 
 
(21) 
 
Variance of abnormal returns 
As the market model assumes abnormal returns to be jointly distrubuted, with a zero 
conditional mean, based on market returns in the even window – the conditional variance is: 
 σ! 𝐴𝑅!" = 𝜎!!! +    1𝐿! 1+ (𝑅!" −   𝜇!)!𝜎!!  (22) 
From (22), the conditional variance of the abnormal return consists of two components. The 
first is the variance of noise-residuals, the same as in (9) and (10). The second part consists 
of additional variance given due to random sampling errors in 𝛼! and 𝛽!. MacKinlay (1997) 
argue that if the estimation window (L1) becomes large, the second variance component will 
tend towards zero as the sampling errors of the parameters vanish. Thus, we assume !!! 1+ (!!"!  !!)!!!!  is equal to zero. The variance of the abnormal return is then given by,  
 σ! 𝐴𝑅!" ≃ 𝜎!!!  (23) 
 
 
                                                
9  The time period from T0 till T120. 
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Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
To draw any overall conclusion of abnormal returns we need to aggregate the returns along 
two dimensions; time and across shares/firms. To aggregating through time MacKinlay uses 
the concept of cumulative abnormal returns. We define  𝐶𝐴𝑅! 𝑡!, 𝑡!   as cumulative abnormal 
return from t0 to tj, where tj10 represents the length of the event window.	   
 𝐶𝐴𝑅!(𝑡!, 𝑡!) =    𝐴𝑅!"!!!!!!  
(24) 
 
Same assumptions as earlier (23) give variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅! to be; 
 
 σ! 𝑡!, 𝑡! ≃ (𝑡! − 𝑡!)𝜎!!!  (25) 
 
Average abnormal return (AAR) 
We also need to aggregate abnormal returns of all insider traded shares. This is simply done 
by aggregating the abnormal returns and dividing by the number of firms. 
 𝐴𝐴𝑅! =    1𝑁 𝐴𝑅!"!!!!  (26) 
 
Variance of abnormal returns 
The variance of abnormal returns for all events N at time t, for large L1, can be found by 
calculating the average of variance of error-terms on all stocks in the event window.  
                                                
10 Thus, tj indicate either t2, t20, t60 or t120. 
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 σ! 𝐴𝐴𝑅! =    1𝑁! 𝜎!!!!!!!  (27) 
 
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
A this point we are able to average abnormal returns across shares and time. By doing this, 
we will end up with the average accumulated abnormal returns for insider stocks in the given 
event window.  
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡!, 𝑡!) =    𝐴𝐴𝑅!!!!!!!  
(28) 
 
Variance of cumulative average abnormal returns 
As with abnormal returns (22), we can find the variance of the cumulative abnormal returns 
by aggregating the variance of the abnormal returns in the given time interval in the event 
window.  
 σ! 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡!, 𝑡!) =    𝜎! 𝐴𝑅𝑅!!!!!!!  
(29) 
 
Parametric Test Estimator 
When testing whether abnormal returns are significant, we will use the test estimator given 
by MacKinlay, which is a version of the standard t-test.  
 𝜃! = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡!, 𝑡!)σ! 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡!, 𝑡!) = 1𝑡! − 𝑡!× 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡!, 𝑡!)𝜎 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡!, 𝑡!)   ~  𝑁(0,1) (30) 
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It is important to note a couple of things. Our model is not value weighted. This means the 
“portfolio” of companies with insider trades is equally weighted. In effect, the possible 
abnormal returns we might find will be the average abnormal return earned by insiders. It is 
also worth noting how multiple trading in the same company works. When calculating 
abnormal returns, these models takes the average of the abnormal returns after insider trades. 
Therefore, if a company experience two or more insider trades within a short time period, the 
same abnormal returns will be included more than once. This means that in effect, firms that 
expericence more insider trades are weighted heavier in the “insider portfolio” than firms 
with fewer insider trades, which again means that these firms has a stronger influence on the 
abnormal returns. 
 
Two-sided t-test for difference in means 
In order to test whether insiders across different subsets earn different cumulative abnormal 
returns, we will employ a two-sided t-test where we assume unequal variances in order to 
make the results more robust. The test-estimator estimates whether there is a difference in 
means, and is expressed as: 
 𝑡 = 𝑥! − 𝑥! − 𝜇! − 𝜇!𝜎!!𝑛! + 𝜎!!𝑛!  
(31) 
Where 𝑥𝑖  is the cumulative abnormal return in subset i, 𝑢𝑖  is the expected cumulative 
abnormal returns, 𝜎𝑖2 is the variance of the CARs, and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of observations. The 
test statistic distribution is approximated as an ordinary t-distribution with the degrees of 
freedom calculated using: 
 𝑣 = 𝜎!!𝑛! + 𝜎!!𝑛! !𝜎!!𝑛! !𝑛! − 1+ 𝜎!
!𝑛! !𝑛! − 1
   (32) 
 
All calculated p-values from running the above test is found in appendix B. 
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Other Choices 
When calculating returns, we chose to use logatihmic form. Returns are thus calculated using 
the following formula: 
 𝑟!,! = 𝑙𝑛 𝑃!,!𝑃!,!!!  (33) 
 
There was two reasons for chosing logarithmic form over simple form. The first reason is 
that the use of the logarithmic form gives geometric returns, which can be used to aggregate 
returns across time periods. Because we wish to find cumulative abnormal returns, the 
logatihmic form is the most applicable. The other reason is that the normality assumption is 
needed when using the market model and the multifactor model. The normality assumption 
assume that returns follow a normal distribution. Geometric returns has been shown to 
exhibit stronger normality than arithmetric returns (Henderson 1990), which makes 
interference using logarithmic-form more valid. 
 
7.6 Multiple Regression Analysis Abnormal Returns 
In order to get a better idea of what factors the market reacts the strongest to, we need to use 
a multiple regression. In our data descriptive section, we establish that our factors are 
confounding. For example, top management and board members tend to trade in large 
volumes than managers. If we simply investigate the abnormal returns earned by each insider 
position, we will not be able to account for the fact that insiders in different positions trades 
in different volumes. In order to control for these factors and better estimate the abnormal 
returns to different insider positions, firm characteristics, and trade size, we will run a 
multiple regression analysis on the two days abnormal returns. This will allow us to better 
evaluate the source of the market reaction. The multiple regression takes the following form; 
 𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝜀! (34) 
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where y is the dependent variable and 𝑥!, 𝑥!, . . . , 𝑥! are the independent variables.  𝛽! is the 
constant, 𝛽!,𝛽!,…𝛽! are the coefficients of the independent variables, and 𝜀! is the error 
term. The coefficients are found through an OLS-regression, and in order for our estimates to 
be efficient and consistent we need to assume that errors are i.d.d, and that the independent 
variables are linearly independent of each other. In order to test the significance of the 
coefficients, we use the same test-estimator as in (30).  
7.7 Methodology Portfolio-Mimicking Method 
In order to check the robustness of the long-term abnormal returns found using the event-
based method, we also perform a simple analysis using the portfolio-mimicking method, 
similar to the one used by Zeckhauser et. al. (2003). We first construct our insider portfolio 
by including all stocks that experienced insider purchases in the last 3- and 6- month periods. 
In line with the event-based method, we construct our portfolio so that firms experiencing 
more than one insider trade in a short window are weighted more heavily than firms with 
only single insider trades. We then measure the average daily equal weighted return of the 
insider portfolio. We then employ portfolio performance measurements on the returns of the 
portfolio, using the CAPM with the returns of OSEBX as benchmark. We also perform an 
analysis where we use the multifactor model by controlling for the SMB and HML portfolio 
returns. We use the daily changes in the 10-year govermental bonds as the risk free rate11. In 
order to get cumulative monthly abnormal returns, we simply sum the insider portfolio 
return in each month and subtract the market-, SMB-, and HML-adjusted returns. 
CAPM 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,!   =   𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹! + 𝜀!,! (35) 
where 𝑅!,! is the return on the insider portfolio in month t, 𝑅!,! is the risk free return in 
month t, and RMRF is the value weigthed return in month t minus the risk free return in 
month t. In this model, the 𝛼! is the intercept and it can be interpreted as the abnormal return 
made by the portfolio in month t. 
Three-Factor Model 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,!   =   𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹!+𝛾!𝑆𝑀𝐵! + 𝛿!𝐻𝑀𝐿! + 𝜀!,! (36) 
                                                
11 http://www.norges-bank.no/Statistikk/Rentestatistikk/Statsobligasjoner-Rente-Daglige-noteringer/ 
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where 𝑅!,!, 𝑅!,!, and 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹! are defined as in equation (32). The 𝑆𝑀𝐵! and 𝐻𝑀𝐿! are the 
month t returns to the small-minus-big, and high-minus-low portfolios.  
 
7.8 Methodology Insider Portfolio 
When investigating whether one could earn abnormal profits by following insider trades, we 
will employ the following methodology: First, we use the results from our regressions to 
decide on what firms to include in the portfolio. Next, we will use the data on insider trades 
to decide when (what dates) to include different firms in our portfolio. We will construct two 
insider portfolios - one with a holding period of 3 months, and another with a holding period 
of 6 months.  Next, we will calculate daily, equally weighted returns of our portfolio in the 
01.12.10-15.08.14 period. Finally, we will use an appropriate benchmark and a variety of 
different performance measures to evaluate our portfolio’s risk-adjusted returns.  
In order to adequately measure the profits an outsider would be able to earn by mimicking 
insiders, we included stocks into our insider portfolio on the day of announcement, as 
opposed to the day of the actual insider trade – which would be more adequate when 
studying insiders’ returns. 
As mentioned, former studies often make the mistake of including all insider purchases 
when deciding on whether outsiders would be able to make profits from an insider strategy. 
Like Gelband, we argue that one should rather only include the insider trades with the 
highest likely abnormal returns. Based on our findings, we decided to only including small 
cap companies with a low price-to-book ratio. More specifically, in our insider portfolio we 
only include companies with a market capitalization of less than USD 100m, and a P/B ratio 
below one. In addition to choosing these stocks for their abnormal returns, we chose these 
stocks because of the sound economic rationale behind the abnormal return. Insider trades in 
smaller firms should yield larger abnormal returns because of the larger informational 
asymmetries, and insider trades in firms with recent financial distress should yield stronger 
signals because the convey insider confidence in these firms.  We also chose to disregard 
insider sales because they at large seem to be a poor predictor of abnormal returns. 
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Our strategy requires us to rebalance the portfolio after any inclusion or exclusion of stocks. 
The portfolio is at all times equally weighted, and we place no restrictions on how much our 
portfolio can invest in any single stock. For example, if the portfolio at any time consists of 
three stocks, the weights are 33.33% and the return of the portfolio is calculated as the 
average return earned by these stocks on that given time. If another stock were included, the 
rebalancing mechanism would work so that 8.33% of the holdings in each stock are sold, and 
25% of the portfolio is used to purchase the new stock. The new portfolio return is now 
calculated as the average return of the four existing stocks.  
We analyzed two different strategies, one with a holding period of 3 months, and one with a 
holding period of 6 months. Based on the abnormal returns we found using the event-
method, we would ideally like to hold the stocks for only 3 months. However, as insider 
trades in these types of companies are rather rare, we also decided on investigating holding 
periods of 6 months – hoping to increase the number of stocks in our portfolio. For the same 
reason, we decided to start measuring the portfolio performance after a date where we had at 
least three stocks in the portfolio. We therefore measure portfolio performance in the period 
01.12.10-15.08.14.  
If a second insider trade takes place in the same share within the holding period, the period 
will be extended adequately. In other words, we keep the position for respectively 3 or 6 
months from the last insider transaction. This may result in longer holding periods than first 
expected. One might end up holding the same position for years. We chose not to increase 
the weights in companies experiencing multiple trading, as this in our view only would lead 
to an unnecessary increase in trading costs.  
The three months portfolio has between 1-10 stocks at any given time, and holds 4.4 stocks 
on average. The six months portfolio holds between 2-12 stocks at any given time, and holds 
an average of 6.6 stocks.  
Returns for the portfolio are logarithmically measured on a daily basis, and we find the 
yearly return and standard deviations by the following formulas; 
 𝑟!"#$%! = 1+ 𝑟!"!"#   !"#$%&'  !"#$ − 1 (37) 
 𝜎!"#$%! =   𝜎!"#$%×   𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 (38) 
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The given period, on average, consist of 251 trading days. Daily returns are measured as the 
average daily return in same period.  
When measuring portfolio performance, the choice of benchmark is critical. Generally, the 
benchmark should consist of assets with a similar asset composition and risk profile. 
Considering how our portfolio only consists of small-cap stocks on Oslo Stock Exchange, 
we argue that the most reasonable index to use as a benchmark is the Oslo Small Cap Index 
(OSESX12). However, because of the underperformance of said index in recent years, we 
chose to perform our analysis on both OSEBX and OSESX in order to get a clearer and more 
robust picture of the portfolio performance.  
                                                
12 OSESX - Oslo Børs Small Cap Index – consisting of the 10% lowest capitalized shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
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8. Data Sources and Descriptive Data 
Our data covers daily prices of publically traded firms on Oslo Stock Exchange, company 
specific information such as market and book values, and information on insider purchases.  
The price data was obtained from Dovre Forvaltning, which obtained the data from Macro-
Bond. It includes daily prices on all publically traded firms on Oslo Stock Exchange from 
1986 until today.  The dates are following the calendar year, meaning prices on dates with no 
trading are the same as the previous trading day. We obtained the OSEBX, OSESX and 
OAAX index returns from the Oslo Stock Exchange web page13. 
The data on the insider trades was also obtained from Dovre Forvaltning. The data consists 
of 4927 insider trades from 10.11.2008-25.09.2014. It also includes information on which 
company the trade was made in, the name of the insider, the position of the insider, whether 
it was a purchase or sale, the number of shares, the price, the value of the trade, the holdings 
after the trade was completed, and the relative change in holdings. The dataset also contains 
data on the date of the trade and on the date of the announcement of the trades.  
The dataset contains insider trades in 279 public and private companies. After eliminating 
data on private companies, and periods of no interest, we end up with 2625 relevant insider 
trades in 142 firms. After aggregating insider trades made by the same person on the same 
day, we end up with 2360 insider trades. (e.g we view a purchase of 10000 shares and a 
purchase of 5000 shares as a purchase of 15000 shares). Removing the trades on Oslo Axess, 
we finally end up with 1998 trades to analyze. It is worth noting that only 101 of the insider 
trades were reported on the same day as the actual trade took place. The rest were reported 
on the following day. Out of the 1998 trades, 1559 were purchases and 439 were sales. Over 
the whole period, the average firm reported 10.9 insider trades, and on average, the insiders 
bought for NOK 3.600.000. However, because of some extreme outliers, the median was 
only NOK 204.412, which better depicts the average purchase value. Looking at relative 
changes, we find that on average the investors increased their holdings by 36% when using 
mean, and 22% when using the median. The following panel reports the mean, median, 
number of trades, 25% and 75% percentiles, and minimum and maximum values for insider 
purchases. These statistics are reported for both the absolute value of the purchase in NOK, 
                                                
13 http://www.oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet/stockIndexList?newt__menuCtx=1.6 
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and for the relative change in holdings. Furthermore, because we have access to data on 
change in holdings, we were able to look if the first purchase undertaken by insiders differs 
from subsequent purchases. We therefore also report the statistics on the relative change 
excluding the first purchase, and the absolute values of the first purchase.  
Panel 1a): Descriptive statistics for trade volume and number of trades, all purchases 
When looking at yearly statistics, we find that 2011 was the year with both the highest 
number of reported purchases, and the highest purchase-to-sales ratio. We also find that 
2013 was the year with the lowest purchase-to-sales ratio. Interestingly, 2011 was the year 
with the worst performance on Oslo Børs, and 2013 was the year with the best performance. 
This could indicate that the Insiders are contrarian.  
When looking at monthly statistics, we notice that the highest percentage of trades takes 
place in the month after the quarterly reports. This is because of the blackout period that 
restricts insiders from trading during the one-month prior to quarterly reports. We also note 
that insiders tend to purchase earlier in the year, and that 20% of all sales comes in 
November. This is likely because of tax purposes where insiders sell to realize losses and 
gain the tax benefits. 
 
Figure 2a: Purchase to sales ratio vs. market return by year    Figure 2b: Insider trades dispersion by month 
 
All	  Purchases Observations Mean Median 25	  % 75	  % Min Max
Number	  of	  trades 1559 10.9 8 4 14 1 57
Net	  Value 1559 3	  600	  000kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   204	  412kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   87	  600kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   751	  000kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  250kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   900	  000	  000kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Change 1559 36	  % 20	  % 4	  % 58	  % 0 1
Change	  Excluding	  first	  purchase 1296 22	  % 13	  % 3	  % 33	  % 0 0.99
Net	  Value	  First	  Trade 263 579	  518kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   193	  320kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   90	  000kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   460	  656kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4	  100kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  680	  000kr	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 As mentioned, the insider data discloses the position of the insiders. The original dataset we 
received had quite detailed data on insider positions as seen in the appendix. Given that we 
wanted to test the information asymmetry hypothesis, we decided to divide insiders into the 
following five categories; Top management, board member, managers, primary insiders, and 
others.  
In the first category, we chose to put CEO’s and CFO’s. These are likely to have the most 
accurate and most recent information on the firm. Under board members, we put all people 
on the board, both regular board members and chairmen. In the manager category, we put all 
managers and directors who were not CEO’s or CFO’s. The idea is that these managers are 
likely to have less information regarding the firm as a whole, for example the direction and 
the strategy of the firm. The primary insider category is simply all the insiders listed as 
primary insiders in the dataset we got from Dovre. The legal definition of a primary insider 
is insiders who are directly linked to the company. We therefore we suspect that this 
category was used to gather the insiders they were unable to assign to any other categories. 
In the last category, we put all the other insiders such as relatives, consultants, and insiders 
in affiliated companies, large shareholders etc. In the following table, we present the data on 
trade volume in the different insider categories. Again, we urge the reader to pay particular 
attention to the median averages rather than the mean averages because of outliers.  
Panel 1b: Descriptive statistics for trade volume by insider position 
We note that the “other” category on average trades in higher volume.  This can be explained 
by the fact that relatives and large shareholders often tend to trade in large volumes. When 
looking at board members, top management and managers, we find that board members on 
average trade in the largest absolute volumes, followed by top management and then 
Trade	  Volume	  by	  Insider	  Position Observations Mean Median 25	  % 75	  % Min Max
Other Net	  Value 671 6	  166	  117.00kr	  	   256	  000.00kr	  	   82	  500.00kr	  	  	  	   1	  227	  000.00kr	  	   2	  500.00kr	  	   900	  000	  000.00kr	  	  
Change 663 0.35 0.15 0.02 0.56 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 551 0.2 0.09 0.01 0.31 0 0.98
Primary	  Insider Net	  Value 105 861	  375.00kr	  	  	  	  	   212	  500.00kr	  	   37	  440.00kr	  	  	  	   500	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	   2	  500.00kr	  	   17	  500	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  
Change 105 0.29 0.11 0.01 0.5 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 90 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.26 0 0.97
Manager Net	  Value 229 369	  034.00kr	  	  	  	  	   137	  700.00kr	  	   59	  500.00kr	  	  	  	   274	  800.00kr	  	  	  	  	   4	  000.00kr	  	   6	  905	  800.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  
Change 227 0.43 0.3 0.12 0.68 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 183 0.29 0.23 0.09 0.47 0.01 0.99
Board	  Member Net	  Value 258 3	  901	  672.00kr	  	   132	  758.00kr	  	   312	  068.00kr	  	   1	  000	  000.00kr	  	   7	  921.00kr	  	   540	  000	  000.00kr	  	  
Change 258 0.37 0.25 0.02 0.62 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 206 0.21 0.09 0.01 0.38 0 0.99
Top	  Management Net	  Value 296 1	  023	  837.00kr	  	   181	  350.00kr	  	   89	  400.00kr	  	  	  	   455	  100.00kr	  	  	  	  	   2	  325.00kr	  	   73	  100	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  
Change 296 0.33 0.07 0.18 0.5 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 255 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.29 0 0.99
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managers. This is in line with what we would expect based on income. When looking at 
relative volumes, we see that managers trade in the largest volumes, followed by board 
members and then top management. We also notice that the discrepancies between the 
categories are smaller with the relative measure.  
The firm specific information was obtained from Damodarans web page14. We gathered 
year-end data on market cap and P/B-ratios, and used these to assign firms in t+1 (ex. we 
used the size and BM-ratios for year end 2009 to assigning the firms into groups in 2010).  
The data obtained from Demodaran was not complete, so we used Bloomberg to obtain data 
on the firms and years where data was missing. We also crosschecked the data from the two 
sources, and found the data to be very similar. However, we were not able to find data on 
size and value for 92 of the insider trades, which accounts for 6% of the sample.  
When assigning firms to size and BM categories, we chose to categorize them in order to 
maximize the informational asymmetries and signal strength. We also take into consideration 
their relative values when choosing our categories. For the size category, we define small-
cap as firms with market capitalization under USD 100M, which roughly translates to the 
35th percentile. We define the mid-cap firms as firms with a market capitalization between 
USD 100M and USD 1000M, which roughly translates to firms between the 85th percentile 
and the 35th percentile. Finally, we define large-cap firms as firms with a market 
capitalization above USD 1000M, which are the firms in the 85th percentile. Large-cap firms 
are likely to have the smallest informational asymmetries, and small-cap firms the largest. 
This categorization is also in line with other empirical studies on insider trading.  
We used slightly different percentiles when categorizing firms after BM-ratios. We chose to 
define value firms as firms with a P/B under 0.75, which roughly translates to the 25th 
percentile. We categorized growth firms as firms with a P/B-ratio above 2.5, which roughly 
translates to the 85th percentile. The mid-BM firms are the firms in between. We chose these 
P/B ratios in order to get a clear distinction of value and growth firms. This is because the 
insider information in these firms is likely to be extra valuable. Even though growth firms 
are often popular among the public, and thus actively followed by analysts15, inside 
information in these firms is likely to be particularly valuable because a large part of the 
                                                
14 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html 
15 Barth, Kasznik and McNichols (2001) 
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values in these firms is derived from expectations of future performance. These expectations 
are again very sensitive to information on current performance and information that is hard 
to come by, such as R&D expenditures. Firms in the value category are often recent losers 
who have fallen out of favor, and who have experienced financial distress. These firms 
receive less analyst coverage meaning higher informational asymmetries, and because of the 
danger of bankruptcy, the inside information in these firms should also be particularly 
valuable.  
Panel 1c: Descriptive statistics for trade volume by firm size 
Panel 1d: Descriptive statistics for trade volume by book-to-market value 
We observe that absolute trade volume increases with firm size, as expected. However, 
relative trade volumes are about the same across the different firm sizes.  
When looking at PB-ratios and medians, we notice that insiders in the value category trade in 
the highest volumes, followed by the MidBM category and then the growth category. Again, 
relative trades volumes are about the same in the different categories.  
 
 
Trade	  Volume	  by	  Firm	  Size Observations Mean Median 25	  % 75	  % Min Max
SmallCap Net	  Value 417 kr	  881	  525 kr	  132	  000 kr	  52	  200 kr	  345	  000 kr	  1	  250 kr	  73	  100	  000
Change 412 0.36 0.16 0.03 0.54 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 344 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.33 0 0.98
MediumCap Net	  Value 753 kr	  2	  622	  660 kr	  245	  485 kr	  100	  794 kr	  819	  750 kr	  3	  925 kr	  405	  000	  000
Change 745 0.34 0.2 0.03 0.55 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 627 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.33 0 0.99
LargeCap Net	  Value 297 kr	  10	  200	  000 kr	  311	  600 kr	  140	  678 kr	  1	  555	  800 kr	  4	  000 kr	  900	  000	  000
Change 297 0.37 0.21 0.06 0.65 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 243 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.35 0 0.99
Trade	  Volume	  by	  Firm	  Value Observations Mean Median 25	  % 75	  % Min Max
Value Net	  Value 353 2	  225	  714.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	   272	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	   99	  793.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  083	  360.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2	  325.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	   73	  700	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Change 412 0.36 0.16 0.03 0.54 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 303 0.22 0.13 0.03 0.35 0 0.99
MidBM Net	  Value 819 4	  238	  292.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	   210	  686.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	   92	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   770	  700.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  250.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	   900	  000	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Change 809 0.35 0.19 0.03 0.61 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 660 0.2 0.11 0.02 0.32 0 0.99
Growth Net	  Value 295 881	  525.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   132	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	   52	  200.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   345	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3	  925.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	   405	  000	  000.00kr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Change 295 0.38 0.21 0.05 0.5 0 1
Change	  ex.	  first	  purchase 251 0.22 0.14 0.03 0.35 0 0.97
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9. Results 
In this chapter, we introduce the results from our analysis. We first give a brief overview of 
how we test each hypothesis, and then we present the relevant results in a panel with a brief 
presentation of our findings. Finally we interpret the results and its’ implication towards our 
hypotheses. Additionally, we relate our findings towards existing empirical findings and 
economic theory.  
We use a standard two sided t-test in all of our estimations, and a one sided t-test if results 
are barely insignificant. We refer to results as highly significant if they are statistically 
significant at a 1% level and significant if they are statistically significant at a 5% level. 
Results found to be significant are referred to as barely insignificant. We show the results for 
both the Market Model (MM) and the Multifactor Model (MF). We will also report the 
results from the portfolio mimicking method when looking at total insider returns in the 3- 
and 6- month window. All the panels report the cumulative abnormal return as CAAR, and 
standard errors are given in the parenthesizes. Statistical significance is denoted by the * 
signs following the alpha, where one star indicates statistical significance at a 10% level, two 
stars at a 5% level, and three stars at a 1% level. The reported N is the number of analyzed 
insider trades. Bear in mind that all the abnormal returns calculated are in absence of 
transaction costs.  
With the exception of hypothesis 3, we used the standard event study approach where we 
aggregate cumulative abnormal returns over all companies and test whether they differ from 
zero. 
9.1 Hypothesis 1: Long-Term Abnormal Return Purchases 
 
H1: Does insiders on Oslo Stock Exchange on average earn abnormal profit in the 1, 3 
and 6 months following insider purchases? 
In testing this hypothesis, we use the event approach for all of the periods, and we use the 
portfolio-mimicking approach to supplement our findings in the three- and six month 
windows. 
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All Purchases Event Studies 
       
 MM1 MF1 MM3 MF3 MM6 MF6 
CAAR 1.73%*** 3.03%*** 1.44% 1.56% -0.759% -1.90% 
 (0.00478) (0.00989) (0.0157) (0.0119) (0.0146) (0.0150) 
N 1249 1248 1216 1218 1164 1166 
Panel 2a: Abnormal Returns All Purchases, Event Study method 
 
 
 Mimicking Portfolio 3 months             Mimicking Portfolio 6 months 
Panel 2b and 2c: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
3 and 6 Months All-Purchases, Portfolio-Mimicking Method 
Figure 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns One Month Following Insider Trades 
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3 Factor 
Model 
RMRF 0.866*** 0.938*** 
 (0.156) (0.148) 
SMB  0.299* 
  (0.178) 
HML  0.251 
  (0.184) 
CAAR -1.12%* -0.66% 
 (0.00628) (0.00573) 
R2 0.402 0.545 
N 48 48 
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3 Factor 
Model 
RMRF 1.024** 1.082** 
 (0.410) (0.416) 
SMB  0.329 
  (0.498) 
HML  0.763 
  (0.515) 
CAAR -1.88% -0.99% 
 (0.0166) (0.0161) 
R2 0.119 0.241 
N 48 48 
-­‐1,50	  %	  
-­‐1,00	  %	  
-­‐0,50	  %	  
0,00	  %	  
0,50	  %	  
1,00	  %	  
1,50	  %	  
2,00	  %	  
2,50	  %	  
3,00	  %	  
-­‐10	   -­‐5	   0	   5	   10	   15	   20	   25	  
Cumula&ve	  
Abnormal	  Return	  
Trading	  Days	  
CAAR	  
 65 
1 month 
Using the Market Model, we can see from table xxx that insiders on average earn a highly 
significant abnormal return of 1.7 % in the 20 days following the insider purchase. Using the 
Multifactor Model, we find a highly significant abnormal return of 3.03 %. It is somewhat 
surprising to see that the CAAR found using the multifactor model is larger than the CAAR 
found using the market model. Earlier empirical research has usually found that when 
controlling for size and BM-value, insiders seem to earn less than when using the market 
model. The reason for the increase in abnormal returns when using the multifactor model is 
the trend that we documented earlier. As we can see from the descriptive section, insiders on 
average trade more in small firms and value firms than in large firms and growth firms. 
Because the SMB- and HML-portfolios have underperformed compared to the OSEBX in 
the short term, and because insiders trade more in small companies and value companies, it 
produces a downward bias when not accounting for size and BM-values.  
 
3 Months 
Using the market model, we find that insiders on average earn a cumulative abnormal return 
of 1.4% in the 60 days following insider trades. Using the multifactor model, we find a 
CAAR of 1.6%. However, the 3 months CAARs results are not significant for either model. 
The reason for the loss in significance is both larger standard errors in the abnormal returns 
and smaller CAARs.  
Using the portfolio mimicking method, we find a negative CAAR of -1.1% using the CAPM 
model, and a CAAR -0.7% using the 3-factor model. We notice that neither of these are 
significant using the two-sided t-test, but the CAAR of the CAPM model becomes 
significantly smaller than zero at a 5% level using a one-sided t-test. The reported RMRF is 
interpreted as the beta of the portfolio, and in the CAPM model we notice that is smaller than 
one, indicating that insiders on average trades in less market-sensitive stocks than the 
average investor. We also note that neither the SMB nor the HML factors are significant in 
the 3-factor model, which means the size and value factor explains little of the returns of the 
insider portfolio. We also notice that the reported R2 values are quite low. An R2 of 0.402 
means that 40.2% of the variation in the returns of the insider portfolio is explained by the 
variation in the returns of the market.  
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6 months 
Neither of the models finds any statistical significant abnormal returns in the 6 months 
following insider trades. We also note that the RMRF betas increase, and that the explaining 
power of the model decrease.  
 
Results Discussion 
On average, we find evidence for insiders earning abnormal returns in the month following 
insider trades, but not in a 3- and 6- month period. Using the portfolio mimicking method 
and CAPM, we surprisingly find some weak evidence for insiders underperforming the 
market in a 3-month period. However, do to the fact that the CAPM have been found to 
poorly model risk, we conclude that insiders on average are no better than the average 
investor at predicting future long run performance. We do however find abnormal 
performance in the 1-month window following insider trades. This is in line with our 
expectations, and in accordance with the informational asymmetry theory. However, by 
looking at graph xxx, we see that most of the abnormal returns accumulate within the first 
two trading days following the insider trade. This implies that most of the abnormal returns 
are a result of the markets reacting to the information signal from the insider trade, and not 
by abnormal firm performance in the following months. It also implies that the market 
quickly incorporates new information into the prices. In fact, by looking at the graph we see 
that cumulative abnormal return decreases over time, which could imply that long-term firm 
performance is worse than the initial expectations of the market. In relation to the market 
efficiency theory, our results indicate that the market holds strong form efficiency in the long 
run. It is interesting to note that because insiders are prevented from short term trading due 
to the laws on manipulation; it implies that insiders on average do not earn abnormal returns 
at all.  
It is also worth noting that the reported R2 values of our models are quite low. This 
implicates that insider on average trade in companies that are different from the market. 
Our results are on average in line with previous empirical research. Using the market model 
on the UK market in the 1991-1998 period, Fidermuc et. al.(2006) found a significant CAAR 
of 1.65% in the five day window following insider trades. Looking at the graph xxx, we see 
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that our 5 day CAAR using the market model is approximately 2.3%. Most likely, the largest 
reason for the difference is the much speedier reporting in the Norwegian markets. In the 
UK, insiders are required to report their transactions to the market within 6 days. Because 
the time between the actual trade and the announcement of the trade is longer, it is likely that 
some of the informational value of the transaction is lost, as argued by Fidermuc. et. 
al(2010).  
Comparing our long run results, we find some differences. Using the portfolio-mimicking 
method and Four-Factor Model on the US market in the 1976-1996 period, Zeckhauser et. al. 
found a six month CAAR f 4.3%. It is worth noting that the only 0.3% of the total CAAR 
came from after the first month. They found the 1-month CAAR to be 3.9%, which is 
approximately in line with our 1 month CAAR using the multifactor model. Many potential 
factors can account for the differences in the long-term results. We perform our study using 
data that are more recent. Technological innovations and analyses that are more 
sophisticated have increased the efficiency of the markets, which makes it harder to make 
abnormal returns. Furthermore, in addition the differences in regulation between the 
countries, there can be many cultural differences. In line with our research on Oslo Børs, 
Smith and Eckbo did not find any long run abnormal returns in the 1985-1992 period, using 
a more sophisticated portfolio approach that accounted for the actual insider holding periods.  
They hypothesize that compared to other markets, insiders on Oslo Børs only rarely possess 
inside information. They also argue that the explanation could be that the value of 
maintaining corporate control benefits offset the value of trading on insider information. 
In graph xxx we also observe that CAARs prior to insider trades seem to be negative. This is 
in line with what Seyhun et. al. (2010) and Fidermuc et. al (2006) found, and indicates 
insider timing ability. In other words, insiders seem to act contrarian. 
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9.2 Hypothesis 2: One-Month Abnormal Returns Sales 
H2: Are insider sales on average followed by negative abnormal returns in the following 
month?  
In testing this, we employ the market model over a 1-month period. Because earlier research 
has found sales to be little informative, we chose to yield the insider sales less attention so 
that we can concentrate on insider purchases. When testing this hypothesis, we will use 
exactly the same method as when testing H1. One thing worth noting is that we only end up 
with 354 insider sales, which is a lot less than for purchases. 
 MarketModel 
CAAR -1.55% 
 (0.0159) 
N 354 
Panel 3: One-month cumulative abnormal returns sales 
 
Results Discussion 
On average, we find a CAAR of -1.6%, but this is not statistically significant due to large 
variations in the abnormal returns. Overall, insider sales seem to be less informative than 
purchases, which is in line with our expectations and former research. This is because there 
are many more potential reasons for selling, whereas purchases are most often undertaken 
because of a profit motive. However we do find it somewhat peculiar that we are unable to 
find significant CAARs at the whole.  
We also broke down the analysis further, and a couple of findings are worth mentioning. 
Looking at firm characteristics, we found a statistically significant CAAR of -1.2% 
following insider sales in large firms, and CAAR of -4.9% in value firms. 
One potential explanation for the significant CAAR in the large firm category is that large 
firms often receive a lot of attention, and it is likely that the market follows insider trades 
more closely in such companies. A quick google search will reveal that Norwegian financial 
newspapers are quick to point out any insider sales in the most prominent firms, and the 
negative CAAR can possible be explained by the market reacting to these articles. The 
negative CAAR in value firms is quite reasonable. Value firms are often firms that have 
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recently experienced financial distress. Insider sales in value firms could thus potentially 
lead to stronger market reactions because the downside in these firms is larger. We also point 
out that the underperformance following insider trades in value firms is quite large, which 
makes economic sense. 
We also notice that insiders tend to sell in much larger volume when they first sell. Only 
20% of the sales were sales for less than kr 200.000, as opposed to purchases where 45% 
consisted of less than kr 200.000. 
 
9.3 Hypothesis 3: Firm Characteristics 
H3: Does book-to-market ratios and firm size affect the abnormal returns earned by 
insiders? 
In order to test this hypothesis, we aggregate the abnormal returns of the firms in each size 
and value category, and use the same method as before in detecting abnormal returns. 
As mentioned, we were unable to find data on market-cap and P/B for about 6.5% of the 
firms at the time of the insider trade. However, we chose not to remove these trades as it 
could bias our results. This is because the type of firms with missing values is likely to differ 
from the average type of firms. For example, if there was a higher proportion of small firms 
with missing values, and if insiders in these firms on average earned higher abnormal 
returns, removing these firms would result in a downward bias. 
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Figure 4a: Insider trades across BM-ratio         Figure 4b: Insider trades across firm size 
  All Smallcap Midcap Largecap Value MidBM Growth Small Value 
CAAR 1m 1.73%*** 5.74%*** -0.271% 0.519% 4.57%*** 0.489% 0.532% 12.9%*** 
  (0.00478) (0.00971) (0.00775) (0.00574) (0.0105) (0.00693) (0.00786) (0.0208) 
N 1249 323 604 254 296 671 214 102 
CAAR 3m 1.44% 6.52%*** -1.91% -0.429% 6.60%*** -2.11% -0.553% 17.1%*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0193) (0.0297) (0.0106) (0.0197) (0.0267) (0.0200) (0.0328) 
N 1216 319 594 236 290 653 206 102 
CAAR 6m -0.759% 4.97% -6.8%*** -1.99% 6.39%** -9.9%*** -0.291% 27.2%*** 
  (0.0146) (0.0346) (0.0202) (0.0155) (0.0311) (0.0177) (0.0338) (0.0526) 
N 1164 303 571 229 289 606 208 99 
Panel 4a: Market Model – Cumulative abnormal returns firm characteristics 
 
  All Smallcap Midcap Largecap Value MidBM Growth Small Value 
CAAR 1m 3.03%*** 5.38%*** 2.74% 0.327% 4.12%*** 2.97% 1.01% 11.5%*** 
 (0.00989) (0.00886) (0.0196) (0.00565) (0.00941) (0.0181) (0.00783) (0.0178) 
N 1248 324 606 250 307 652 221 102 
CAAR 3m 1.56% 5.88%*** -0.991% -0.594% 5.30%*** -1.78% 1.05$ 16.1%*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0177) (0.0216) (0.0105) (0.0172) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0262) 
N 1218 320 592 239 301 636 214 102 
CAAR 6m -1.90% 3.79% -7.5%*** -1.92% 6.02%** -10.5%*** -1.52% 26.8%*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0328) (0.0231) (0.0154) (0.0295) (0.0201) (0.0330) (0.0468) 
N 1166 303 568 234 289 607 209 99 
Panel 4b: Multifactor Model – Cumulative abnormal returns firm characteristics 
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1 month  
Looking at panel 4 a) and b), when comparing abnormal returns across different firm sizes 
we see that only insiders in small firms seem to be making abnormal returns in the first 
month following insider trades. Using the market model, we find the small-cap CAAR to be 
5.7% and highly statistically significant. Looking at the BM category, we notice a highly 
significant CAAR of 4.6% for value firms. Note that both these are larger than insider 
returns across all purchases.  
Following Lakonishok et. al., we wanted to look at abnormal returns when combining size 
and BM values. We did find a highly interesting relationship, namely that insiders in small, 
value firms earns huge abnormal returns. More specifically, we found a highly significant 
CAAR of 12.9% in the 20 days following insider trades.  
Using the multifactor model, we end up with the same conclusions. Only insider trades in 
small-cap firms and value firms yield statistically significant CAARs. As expected, we see 
that CAARs in the multifactor model are marginally smaller than CAARs of the market 
model. However, they are not significantly different.  
 
3 Months 
Interestingly, all the statistical interference made in the 1 month model holds, even though 
the overall CAAR no longer is significant. We notice that the CAAR for small firms 
increases only slightly, indicating that most of the abnormal returns is made in the first 
month. We also notice that CAARs for value firms increases to 6.7%, indicating that insiders 
in these firms continue to earn abnormal profits after the first month of trading. The CAARs 
of the small, value firms increases to 17.1%, and are still highly statistically significant. The 
CAARs of the multifactor model are on average about 1 % smaller than in the market model.  
 
6 Months 
We find a couple of interesting results when looking at a 6-month window. First we notice 
that CAARs for small-cap firms disappear in both models. The size of the CAARs is still 
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quite large, so the loss of statistical significant is due to larger variation in small firm 
performance. CAAR in value firms however seem to persist. Moreover, CAARs in small, 
value firms are still both highly economically and statistically significant with 120 day 
CAARs of 27.2% in the market model, and 26.8% in the multifactor model.    
Another thing we notice is that CAARs for firms with P/B between 0.75 and 2.5 suddenly 
becomes highly statistically significant with a CAAR of -9.9% in the market model, and -
10.5% in the multifactor model. The same effect is seen with the mid-cap firms with 
negative CAARs of respectively -6.8% and -7.5%.  
 
Results Discussion 
In line with our expectations and economic theory, we do find evidence that insiders in firms 
with different firm characteristics earn different abnormal returns that are significantly 
different. In relation to our hypothesis, we find that size and value factors do affect abnormal 
returns earned by insiders.  The informational asymmetry seems to hold in that insiders in 
small firms earns higher abnormal returns compared to insiders in larger firms. This is likely 
because smaller firms are less thoroughly analyzed and insiders in these firms should 
therefore have a larger informational advantage. Another possible reason is that these 
insiders feel less scrutinized, and thus takes greater risks and trades on information that is in 
the grey area. We also note that our model does not find any CAARs for midcap and 
largecap firms.  
Looking at the BM values, we find that only insiders in value firms earn significant 
abnormal returns. We chose our value firms to have a relative low P/B ratio compared to 
other studies. This means that our value firms have likely experienced financial distress in 
the period prior to the insider trades. The economic reasoning for the abnormal returns 
earned by these investors is that these firms have likely experience financial distress lately. 
With a P/B-ratio under 0.75, the market believed these firms to be destroying value at the 
start of the year. This is something we often see in financial distressed firms, where agency 
and direct & indirect financial distress cost destroys firm value. Assuming insiders are 
rational and do not trade to manipulate the market, insider purchases in these firms should 
give extra strong signals. Because there often are fears of these firms going bankrupt, insider 
trades in these firms effectively removes some of the concern that these firms will go 
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bankrupt and thus limits the potential downside. Firms with a low P/B ratio are also often 
stocks that are unpopular among the public. Because of this, fewer analysts tend to follow 
these stocks. As with firm size, this would lead to informational asymmetries. This could 
also contribute in explaining why we did not find any abnormal returns for growth firms. 
These firms are often past winners and glamour stocks, and analysts extensively follow 
them, which effectively decreases the information asymmetry.  
The same economical reasoning can be used when explaining the huge abnormal returns in 
the small, value firms. However, the risk of insolvency and bankruptcy is even larger in 
these firms due to their size, which could explain the larger abnormal returns.  
Considering that the abnormal returns across all purchases disappeared when looking at 
longer periods, we find it interesting that the abnormal returns in the smallcap subset persist 
in the three-month period and that the abnormal returns in the value subset persist in the six-
month window. This further supports the informational asymmetry hypothesis, because 
insiders in these firms seem to be able to predict future performance better than the market, 
implying that they have access to better information.  
We also find it particularly interesting to look at the long term abnormal returns of the small, 
value subset. The CAAR in this subset actually increases over time, and remains highly 
statistically significant in all models and all periods. As we have argued, the size of the 
abnormal returns is likely due to large informational asymmetries. It is also interesting to see 
that the size of the CAARs remains large after controlling for the SMB and HML factors. If 
we correctly control for these factors, it means that the abnormal returns are most likely due 
to insider content only.  
Finally, we notice the large negative 6-month CAARs following insider trades in the midcap 
and midvalue subset. We have not seen this effect in any other studies, and we are not able to 
come up with any economic reasoning to explain this effect.  
Our results differ somewhat in regards to former studies. However, the results are not 
directly comparable doe to the fact that we employ different cut offs when categorizing after 
size and value. Similar to our results, Zeckhauser et. al. and Lakonishok et. al. found 
evidence of abnormal returns for small firms, but not large and medium firms when using a 
1/3 cutoff. When looking at BM-ratios, we find some differences. Zeckhauser et. al. did not 
find any abnormal performance in any of their value categories, but their results indicated 
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that insiders in growth firms performed  better. The most likely reason for the difference is 
that they used 1/3 cut offs, which means that on average, their value stocks had higher P/B 
ratios than our value stocks. This again would decrease the likelihood of financial distress in 
their value portfolio.  
 
9.4 Hypothesis 4: Insider Position 
H4: Does different types of insiders earn different abnormal return? 
The method when testing for CAARs is the same as before. We simply aggregate abnormal 
returns across all of the categories we made in the descriptive data section and test them. In 
the following we present the results. 
  
All Top 
Management 
Board 
Members 
Managers Primary 
Insiders 
Others 
CAAR 1m 1.73%*** 1.99%* 2.34%* 3.45%*** -0.0366% 0.861% 
  (0.00478) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.00746) 
N 1249 242 230 211 87 479 
CAAR 3m 1.44% 2.92% 6.54%*** 5.75%*** 0.297% -3.36% 
  (0.0157) (0.0290) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0246) (0.0356) 
N 1216 238 222 201 86 469 
CAAR 6m -0.759% -2.28% 7.25%** 5.64%* 0.354% -6.64%*** 
  (0.0146) (0.0361) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0429) (0.0234) 
N 1164 235 210 190 82 447 
Panel 5a: Market Model – Cumulative abnormal returns insider position 
 
  
All Top 
Management 
Board 
Members 
Managers Primary 
Insiders 
Others 
CAAR 1m 3.03%*** 2.84%*** 2.19%* 3.62%*** -0.268% 3.86% 
  (0.00989) (0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0104) (0.00858) (0.0239) 
N 1248 242 231 209 86 480 
CAAR 3m 1.56% -1.21% 9.23%** 6.29%*** -1.47% -2.14% 
  (0.0119) (0.0243) (0.0418) (0.0191) (0.0206) (0.0178) 
N 1218 238 223 200 88 469 
CAAR 6m -1.90% -4.90% 6.10%* 5.58%* -3.23% -7.05%*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0434) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0374) (0.0227) 
N 1164 235 210 190 82 447 
Panel 5b: Multifactor Model – Cumulative abnormal returns insider position 
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1 Month 
We find using the market model that top management earn a CAAR of 2%, significant on a 
10% level using a two-sided t-test, and 5% using a one-sided t-test. Moreover, board 
members earn a 10% statistically significant CAAR of 2.3% using a two-sided t-test, and 5% 
significant using a one-sided t-test. Managers earn a highly significant CAAR of 3.5%. None 
of the other two categories earn any CAAR. We make the same statistical interference using 
the multifactor model. However, we also notice that CAARs earned by top managers have 
increase to 2.8% and that the results have become highly significant. This suggests that top 
management more often trades in smaller and/or firms with lower P/B-ratios. 
 
3 Months 
Looking at the 3-month window, we find a couple of notable changes. Top Management 
does not seem to make any abnormal returns at all. The CAARs of management increases to 
5.8% in the market model and 6.3% in the multifactor model, and remains highly significant. 
The CAARs of board members increases considerably to 6.5% in the market model and 
9.2% in the multifactor model. Because of the sizable increase, both become significant at a 
5% level. CAARs of the two other categories remain insignificant.  
 
6 Months 
In the 120-day window following insider purchases, only board members in the market 
model earn CAARs that are significant at the 5% level using the two-sided t-test. We do 
however also find that managers in both models earn significant abnormal returns using a 
one-sided t-test. The sizes of the abnormal returns are about the same as in the 3-month 
window, indicating that abnormal returns persists, but do not increase. 
We also notice that the insiders in the “other” category earn a negative CAAR of around -
6.6% in the market model, and -7% in the multifactor model, both highly statistically 
significant.  
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Results Discussion 
Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis. Different types of insiders earn different 
abnormal return. However, because of the different magnitudes and interferences across the 
different models, this relationship does not seem to be as straightforward as we would 
expect. There seem to be more factors than the information asymmetry that states that the 
insiders with the most superior information should earn the highest significant returns. Our 
results indicate that managers and board members are the ones that earn the highest 
abnormal returns, with abnormal returns that are statistically different from the abnormal 
returns in the other groups. 
As mentioned, one potential factor could be that different insiders experience different levels 
of scrutiny, which would affect their willingness to make questionable insider trades. Top 
management is especially prone to this type of scrutiny because they are more visible, and 
this can explain why we fail to find any abnormal returns for top management in the long 
run.  
Another factor for the difference could be to what degree insiders are aware of the firm 
strategy and long-term direction. This could explain why managers outperform board 
members in the short run and vice versa in the long run. These differences are however not 
statistically different. 
The sizable increase in abnormal returns for managers and board members between the 1-
month model and 3-month model is also interesting. Our results suggest that these two 
groups are able to predict future performance better than the market in a 3 months 
perspective. This would again break with strong-form market efficiency because not all 
inside information is reflected in the prices.  
Finally, we notice the significantly negative returns earned by “others” in the six-month 
period. One possible explanation could be that these investors do not have an as good 
understanding of the business as other insiders, and misapprehend the business and the 
signals in the business. In everyday life, a parallel would be small-time investors who pick 
stocks based on opinions made by reading the financial times. As this group also contains 
large shareholders, a possible motivation behind purchases is to increase corporate control. 
Lakonishok and Lee also argue that these shareholders are removed from the decision 
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making process. However, because the composition of insiders in the “other” category is so 
diverse, it is hard to say what the real reason is.  
Again, comparisons to other studies are problematic because of different categorizations of 
different insiders. Lakonishok et. al. divided his sample into managers and large 
shareholders, and only found evidence for significant abnormal returns in a one year period 
for managers. Fidermuc et. al.(2006) looked at short term abnormal returns and divided their 
sample into CEOs, all top executive directors, chairmen, other incumbent directors, former 
directors, and all incumbent directors. They found all categories except former directors to 
be significant, and they found the market reaction to CEOs to be smaller than the other 
categories, which is similar to what we find when looking at short-term returns.  
 
9.5 Hypothesis 5: Trade Volume 
H5: Does the size of insider trades affect abnormal returns? 
When testing this hypothesis, we first categorize the insider trades into categories based on 
trade volume, and then we aggregate the CAARs in each category and test for significance. 
We chose to use both absolute and relative sizes. This is because of the differences in wealth 
across investors. An investment of NOK 100 000 would likely be much more significant for 
a regular manager than it would be for a wealthy CEO or CFO. Additionally, absolute trade 
volume is highly correlated with trade volume so that the results may confound firm-size, 
and trade-volume effects. We used arbitrary values with consideration to their relative values 
within the set. Small absolute trades are defined as trades for NOK 50 000 or less, and 
amounts to around 12% of the sample. Medium absolute trades are trades in between NOK 
50 000 and NOK 200 000, and amounts to around 33% of the sample. Large trades are trades 
over NOK 200 000, and amounts to 55% of the sample. We believe this categorizing to be 
reasonable when looking at the average income in Norway. NOK 50 000 amounts to a 
sizable 10,2% of the average Norwegian yearly income before taxes (2013)16, and NOK 
200 000 amounts to 40,9%. 
                                                
16 http://www.ssb.no/lonnansatt 
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When deciding on relative value of trades, we would ideally like to control for insider 
wealth, but unfortunately, we did not have access to this data. We did however have access 
to data on change in each insider’s share positions. This will work as a proxy since the size 
of change is likely to be positively correlated with insiders’ confidence in the firm. Insiders 
who has a strong belief in the future of their firm are more likely to purchase relatively more 
stocks than insiders with less confidence about the future. We used the same approach as 
with the absolute sizes, and chose relative sizes arbitrary. We also chose to include a new 
category for insiders who made their first purchase. We believe that, from an insider’s 
perspective, the first trade could feel emotionally different from subsequent trades, meaning 
that the emotional toll on these insiders is bigger. Because of this, we hypothesize that the 
first purchase will convey a more credible signal. Additionally, the effort it takes to purchase 
stocks is probably higher the first time, which means that insiders would need to expect 
higher returns to justify the effort. To our knowledge, there have not been any other studies 
investigating such an effect. Small relative trades are defined as trades that change current 
standings with less than 20%, medium relative trades are defined as trades that change 
current standings between 20% and 50%, and large relative trades are trades that change 
current standings more than 50%. The small category amounts to around 55% of the sample, 
the medium category amounts to around 20%, the large category amounts to around 11%, 
and the first purchase category amounts to around 17% of the sample.  
One should note that the proportion of firms in the small, medium and large category is quite 
different between absolute and relative size. This is a result of our arbitrary choice of 
categories, and because of the inclusion of the first trade category. However, all our 
categories should be large enough to discover any potential CAARs.  
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Figure 5a: Absolute trade volume  Figure 5b: Relative trade volume 
  
All Small 
Absolute 
Medium 
Absolute 
Large 
Absolute 
Small 
Relative 
Medium 
Relative 
Large 
Relative 
First 
Trade 
CAAR 
1m 
1.73%*** 1.16% 2.76%*** 1.22%* 0.320% 1.20% 3.67%*** 5.06%*** 
  (0.00478) (0.0109) (0.00863) (0.00660) (0.00619) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0150) 
N 1249 166 419 664 638 253 136 210 
CAAR 
3m 
1.44% -1.13% 1.63% 1.96% -2.24% 1.81% 11.3%** 5.40%* 
  (0.0157) (0.0243) (0.0162) (0.0272) (0.0249) (0.0239) (0.0542) (0.0303) 
N 1216 160 410 646 620 243 130 212 
CAAR 
6m 
-0.759% -9.79%** 1.04% 0.415% -6.9%*** 0.320% 10.7%** 7.82%* 
  (0.0146) (0.0399) (0.0259) (0.0196) (0.0187) (0.0334) (0.0415) (0.0413) 
N 1164 158 394 612 597 237 127 192 
Panel 6a: Multifactor Model – Cumulative abnormal returns trade volume 
 
 
  
All Small 
Absolute 
Medium 
Absolute 
Large 
Absolute 
Small 
Relative 
Medium 
Relative 
Large 
Relative 
First 
Trade 
CAAR 1m 3.03%*** 1.38% 2.56%*** 3.73%** 2.61% 1.42% 2.50% 6.33%*** 
  (0.00989) (0.0108) (0.00845) (0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0101) (0.0237) (0.0243) 
N 1248 166 419 663 636 253 135 213 
CAAR 3m 1.56% -0.795% 2.56% 1.51% -0.857% 0.537% 7.09%
*** 6.15% 
  (0.0119) (0.0236) (0.0256) (0.0144) (0.0112) (0.0224) (0.0258) (0.0521) 
N 1218 162 410 646 619 248 133 207 
CAAR 6m -1.90% -8.97%** -0.049% -1.24% -7.9%*** -0.494% 9.88%** 5.69% 
  (0.0150) (0.0387) (0.0247) (0.0216) (0.0211) (0.0325) (0.0409) (0.0371) 
N 1166 161 394 611 602 233 125 195 
Panel 6b: Multifactor Model – Cumulative abnormal returns trade volume 
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1 Month 
Using the market model, we find highly significant CAARs of 2.8% for absolute medium 
sized trades, and a CAAR of 1.9 % for absolute large trades, significantly larger than zero at 
a 5% level. Small absolute trades yield positive CAARs, but they are not statistically 
significant.  
Using the multifactor model, we find some noticeable differences, both in regards to 
interference and economic size. For absolute size, medium volume trades remain highly 
statistically significant and high volume trades becomes significant at a 5% level using a 
two-sided t-test. However, while the CAAR of medium trades stay the same, we see that the 
CAAR of large trades increases to 3.7%. This is a quite big increase, and it indicates that 
there is a spurious relationship between large trades and firm characteristics. In other words, 
that large absolute purchases are undertaken more often in smaller firms and value firms that 
on average earn less than the market. 
Looking at relative sizes, we now find that only first trades remain statistically significant 
with a CAAR of 6.3%. Large relative trades lose its significance due to standard errors 
doubling, and a 1.2% decrease in CAAR.  
 
3 Months 
In the three-month window, all of the absolute sized trades lose their significance. The size 
of the CAARs remains about the same, so the loss of significance is explained by higher 
variability in the abnormal returns. 
In the market model, we find that CAARs for relative large sales has increased to 11.3%, 
which is statistically significant at a 5 % level. First purchases earn about the same CAAR, 
but they are now only significantly larger than 0 at a 5% level. Using the multifactor model, 
we find a sizable and highly significant CAAR of 7.1% for large relative purchases. First 
purchases still remain quite sizable with a CAAR of 6.2%, but is no longer significant.   
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6 Months  
In the 6 months window, we find a couple of interesting results. The interference from the 
large relative purchase persists in both models persists. The size of the CAAR in the market 
model persists, while it increases to 9.9% in the multifactor model. The CAAR for first 
purchases in the market model increases to 7.8%, and remains significantly larger than 0 at a 
5 % significance level.   
It is also worth noting that CAARs of both relative and absolute small volume trades become 
highly significant with negative values in between 7%- 10%.  
 
Results Discussion 
Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis that trade volume is related to subsequent 
abnormal returns. More specifically, higher trade volumes seem to yield higher subsequent 
abnormal returns than lower volume trades. This makes economic sense because larger 
trades reflect a more positive outlook on the firm’s prospects, and because the market 
interprets larger trades as a more credible signal. However, we do not find any significant 
differences in abnormal returns when looking at absolute trade volumes. Looking at relative 
values, we find significant differences in all models.  
Relative trade volumes seem to give a better indication of future firm performance than 
absolute trade volumes, especially in the long run. This is also in line with what we expected 
because relative volume should better reflect the strength of the investor’s belief. With the 
exception of the one-month model, absolute volume trades give no indication towards long 
run performance, while high relative trade volumes yield higher abnormal returns in the 
three-month period than in the one-month period. Abnormal returns in the six-month 
window also remain significant with the same size as in the three-month window. The fact 
that the CAAR for large relative purchases increases between the first and the third month, 
indicates that insiders trading in relative large volumes are able to predict future performance 
better than the market, implying that markets are not strong form efficient. This could also 
suggest that insiders are more thorough and considerate with their analyses when investing 
larger sums, and that they trade on stronger beliefs.  
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We also found that first time insiders earn significant abnormal returns. In fact, in the one-
month window, the first trade category earned the highest abnormal returns. In the longer 
run, the large volume trades yielded the highest CAARs. This is an interesting finding. There 
could be a couple of reasons for first time investors to perform relatively better at short term 
compared to long term. One explanation could be that the markets interpret first purchases as 
a relatively strong signal and reacts on it. Another explanation could be that insiders making 
their first purchase trade based on specific short-term news-related events. In other words, 
that specific firm related news or events work as catalysts for the first trades. Strictly 
speaking, these insider trades would be in the legal grey area, but as mentioned in the legal 
section, this is not impossible.  
Finally, we would like to comment on the negative six-month performance following small 
trades. The size of these negative abnormal returns is quite significant, and statistically 
significant in all models. One possible explanation for this could be that insiders do not 
really take future performance of the firms into consideration when making small 
adjustments to their position.  
Overall, our findings are in line with former studies. However, comparisons are hard to make 
in this case as well, because both Zeckhauser et. al. and Fidermuc et. al used the fraction of 
firm equity traded in each transaction as a measure of relative trade volume. Fidermuc et. al. 
found the five day CAAR for trades of at least 0.1% of market cap to be 4.6%, and the five 
day CAAR for trades consisting of less than 0.1% of market cap to be 1.7%. Zeckhauser 
found the same short-term relationship, and in the long run they also found larger abnormal 
returns following large and medium trade sizes compared to small trade sizes. We would like 
to point out that we believe we better control for relative trade size by using change in 
holdings. This is because it better captures the strength of the belief of the insider trading. 
Using the fraction of firm equity as a measure of relative wealth takes account of 
confounding effects, but it does not effectively control for relative investor wealth.  
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9.6 Hypothesis 6: Abnormal Returns Prior to Announcement 
H6: Is there any abnormal return on the day prior to the announcement of insider trades? 
In order to test this hypothesis, we chose the following methodology. We drop all 
observations when the date of the insider trades coincides with the date of the 
announcement. This leaves us with the all the insider trades where the announcement of the 
insider trade is on the day following the insider trade. We then simply calculate the one-day 
abnormal returns on the day of the insider trade using the market model, and aggregate this 
across all firms. Because the insider trade is yet to be made public, we should see no 
abnormal return if no one trades on this information. In the event that someone manages to 
discover insider trades before they are made public, we should see abnormal returns.  
  
 All Trades 
CAAR 1.02%*** 
 (0.00181) 
N 1204 
Panel 7: One day abnormal return prior to announcement 
As we can see, the abnormal return on the day of the trade is highly significant with 
abnormal returns of 1%. This is about the same as Inci, Lu and Seyhun (2010) found when 
using intraday prices in the US. This is a quite sizable one-day abnormal return. These 
results suggest that there are market participants that are able to discover insider trades and 
trade on this new information before the public announcement of the trade. It also suggests 
that the biggest adjustment to new information happens even before the announcement of the 
news. 
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9.7 Hypothesis 7: Short-Term Market Reactions 
H7: Do insider purchases provide the markets with new information? 
In order to test H2, we simply test the short-term cumulative abnormal return on the day of- 
and on the day following the announcement (0, 1]. Although our above results indicate that 
here is a quite large market reaction even before the announcement of the insider trade, we 
chose only look at the reaction prior to the announcement in order to be consistent with other 
studies. In doing this, we only use the market model to calculate normal returns. This is 
because SML and HML factors should have no immediate effect on short-term returns. One 
should note that some of the abnormal returns following insider trades might disappear if 
anyone discovers the insider trades before the public announcement. Therefore, these 
measures are not valid when measuring short-term abnormal returns to insiders. They simply 
test whether markets reacts to the announcement of insider trades. 
  All Purchases 
Smallcap Midcap Largecap Value MidBM Growth Small 
Value 
CAAR 0.611%
*** 1.08%*** 0.365%* 0.532%*** 0.771%** 0.396%** 0. 
938%*** 
0. 754% 
 
(0.00134) (0.00308) (0.00205) (0.00132) (0.00300) (0.00182) (0.00287) (0.00656) 
N 1285 328 628 260 306 681 229 102 
Panel 8a: Market Model – Two day cumulative abnormal returns firm characteristics 
 
  
All Top 
Management 
Board 
Members 
Managers Primary 
Insiders 
Others 
CAAR  0.611%*** 0.270% 0.364% 1.19%*** 0.516% 0.657%*** 
  (0.00478) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.00746) 
N 1285 246 235 218 92 494 
Panel 8b: Market Model – Two day cumulative abnormal returns insider position 
 
  All Purchases Small Absolute 
Medium 
Absolute 
Large 
Absolute 
Small 
Relative 
Medium 
Relative 
Large 
Relative 
First Trade 
CAAR 0.00611*** 0.411% 0.581%** 0.681%*** 0.446%** 0.547%** 1.17%*** 0.775%* 
  (0.00134) (0.00358) (0.00254) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00253) (0.00438) (0.00423) 
N 1285 176 428 681 649 268 138 218 
Panel 8c: Market Model – Two day cumulative abnormal returns trade volume 
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Looking at panel 8 a-c, we find the 2 days cumulative abnormal return to be 0.61% and 
highly statistically significant. This confirms our hypothesis H2, and we conclude that 
insider trades produce new information to the markets, making markets more efficient. Our 
results are also in line with former research in other countries. Fidermuc et. al. (2006), 
reported a two-day CAAR following the announcement of 1.16%. However, the size of the 
two-day abnormal return is quite economically small, which would make it hard to make a 
strategy of short-term trading on insider purchases if one is not able to discover insider 
trades before they are made public. We also keep the results in hypothesis 6 in mind, and 
conclude that the total market reaction to insider trades is most likely larger than what the 
results in this section suggest.   
It is also interesting to look at how the market interprets different types of insider trades. In 
other words, does differences in factors such as trade size, BM-ratios, market cap and insider 
type have an effect on the strength of the market reaction? In accordance with former 
research and economic theory, we argue that the market reaction should be strongest when 
informational asymmetries are large and when signals are credible. 
When looking at the size of trades, our results are in line with the earlier research and 
economic theory. We find that the abnormal short-term return is highly significant for all 
types of trades except small absolute trades. However, the sizes of the CAARs differ quite 
much, with investors putting more weight on larger and relative sizes. The likely reason for 
this is that the market perceives these signals to be stronger and more credible. The reader 
should also note that these were the categories found to yield the highest abnormal returns in 
the long-run. It is also interesting to notice that the CAAR of the first time traders yields the 
largest short term market reaction when comparing across relative sizes, indicating that 
investors are aware of the high CAAR earned by these investors in the short run. However, 
they are not statistically different from larger relative trades.  
When looking at different insider types, we find highly significant CAARs for the categories 
“Board Member”, “Managers”, and “Others”. The reaction to insiders’ trades in the “Board 
Member” and “Other” category are about the same, and half of that of “Managers”. Again, 
with the exception of “others”, it is interesting to see that the strongest market reaction 
follows the trades of the largest long-run abnormal returns. 
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It is noteworthy that the market does not react significantly to trades by top management. 
According to informational asymmetry theory, these insiders should have better information 
than other insiders should, and the market reaction should thus be largest following these 
trades. Fidermuc. et. al found that the market to react less to trades by CEOs, but they did 
find a statistically significant market reaction. As mentioned under the other hypothesis 
discussions, top management operates under greater scrutiny, and might therefore be extra 
careful when trading in their own firm. 
When looking at firm categories, we find a couple of interesting results. We find highly 
significant CAARs in all categories except “Small-Value”, which is the category that yields 
highest abnormal returns over all time periods. Other than that, the market reaction in all 
categories is about the same, with the exception of “Smallcap” and “growth”, where 
abnormal returns are almost twice as big as in the other categories. It is not surprising that 
the market reacts so strongly to trades in these categories, as these are the categories where 
the informational asymmetries should be largest. It is however really interesting to see that 
trades in small-value firms do not lead to a significant market reaction. This suggests that the 
market on average is unaware of the huge abnormal returns earned by these firms following 
insider trades. We also note that standard deviation in short-term abnormal returns in the 
small firm category is 2-3 times larger than in other categories. This implies that the market 
reaction following insider trades in these firms varies a lot more than performance in other 
firms. 
Overall, we do find evidence for the market reacting more strongly to insider trades where 
the informational asymmetries are large, and where the signals should be more credible. We 
also find evidence for the market reaction being stronger for the insider trades that earn the 
largest long-term abnormal returns, indicating that the market is aware of these returns. 
These results imply that the market is not strong form efficient. They also suggest that 
insider trades contribute to the informational efficiency of the markets.  
 
Cross-sectional Multiple Regression on Abnormal Returns 
In running the multiple regression, we regress the abnormal returns on firm size, P/B ratio, 
trade volume, and insider type. We chose to implement all factors as dummy variables in 
order to make sure that the explanatory variables are linearly independent of each other. We 
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chose our default dummies to be the categories with the smallest abnormal returns from our 
other regression. We thus use largecap, top management, midBM, and small trades as default 
dummies. That means that the constant measures abnormal returns earned by top 
management when they trade in small volumes in large firms with medium P/B ratios. We 
run regressions with both absolute and relative trades, but we will only show the results for 
relative trades because we made the same interference. We run two different models, one 
with both market cap and BM categories, and on with only the market cap category. The 
categories are the same as in the rest of the paper. We thus run the following regressions; 
Model 1 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠= 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒+ 𝛽!𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟+ 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀! 
(39) 
 
Model 2 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠= 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒+ 𝛽!𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟+ 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽!"𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽!!𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝜀! 
(40) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
Smallcap 0.375%** -0.182% 
 (0.00165) (0.00266) 
   
Midcap -0.333%** -0.627%*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00205) 
   
Medium 
Purchase 
0.0566% -0.0158% 
 (0.00352) (0.00349) 
   
Large 
Purchase 
0.676% 0.480% 
 (0.00452) (0.00448) 
   
First Purchase 0.238% 0.229% 
 (0.00379) (0.00374) 
   
Board 
Member 
0.0638% 0.0817% 
 (0.00440) (0.00435) 
   
Manager 0.930%** 1.06%** 
 (0.00451) (0.00448) 
   
Primary 
insider 
0.318% 0.506% 
 (0.00589) (0.00583) 
   
Others 0.356% 0.489% 
 (0.00376) (0.00373) 
   
Growth  -0.0498% 
  (0.00300) 
   
Value  0.901%*** 
  (0.00156) 
   
_cons 0.204% 0.169% 
 (0.00339) (0.00343) 
R2 0.010 0.035 
N 1285 1285 
Panel 8d: Two day abnormal return multiple regression 
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Overall, the results from the multiple regression analysis are in line with the results from the 
simple two day regression above. However, we notice that many of the categories from the 
simple regression become insignificant when we control for all variables.  
Looking at model 1, we see that the market reaction to insider trades by managers is 
significantly larger than the market reaction following insider trades by top management. 
The market reaction to others is no longer significantly different than the market reaction to 
top management, and the reason is likely that we now control for trades size.  
We also see that the market reaction following insider trades in small cap firms is 
significantly stronger than to insider trades in large cap firms. We also notice that insider 
trades in large cap firms are followed by stronger market reactions than insider trades in mid 
cap firms.  
However, when looking at model 2 we notice something interesting. The small size dummy 
loses its significance, while the market reaction to insider trades in value firms becomes 
significantly larger than the market reaction following insider trades in mid BM firms. The 
reason for this is that many of the small firms also are value firms, and that these were the 
firms were insider trades lead to the largest market reaction. We also notice that the R2 of the 
second model is larger, meaning that this model better explain abnormal returns.  
In regards to the coefficients on medium and large trades, we see that both are positive, 
indicating that larger trades are followed by a stronger market reaction. They are however 
not significant.  
Overall, the results of the multiple regressions suggest that trades by managers are followed 
by the strongest market reaction. One possible reason for this is the possibility that these 
managers are more likely to trade on news specific short term events.  Our results also 
indicate that overall, the market reaction is largest in firms with recent financial distress, 
something that makes economic sense. We also note that the different market reaction is 
quite sizable, with differences up to 1%. 
Using a comparable analysis, Fidermuc et. al (2006) came to similar conclusions as us. They 
found that the market reaction was stronger to trades made by managers and directors 
compared to trades made by CEOs. Further, using omitted dividends, interest coverage ratio, 
and earnings losses as control factors for financial distress, they found the market reaction to 
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be stronger in financial distressed firms. They did not find that trade size or firm size had any 
effect on the market reaction.  
 
9.8 Hypothesis 8: Abnormal Returns Insider Strategy 
H8: Is it possible to earn abnormal profits by following a strategy based on insider 
purchases? 
.  
 
 
Panel 8a: Annualized performance statistics insider portfolios 
 
Figure 8: Insider portfolio performance 
In panel 8a, we present a summary of statistics for the two insider portfolios and the two 
indexes. Confirming our prior results, we find that insider portfolio with a holding period of 
3 months outperforms the 6 months holding period portfolio. 
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  Ratio 1.03 0.73 0.61 0.16
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In the period 01.12.10-15.08.14, our 3 months insider portfolio has earned annualized returns 
of 37.4%, and our 6 months insider portfolios has earned annualized returns of 22.42%, both 
before transaction costs. In comparison, we see that the OSEBX has yielded an annualized 
return of 13.8%, and the OSESX an annualized return of 5.26%. However, we also notice the 
huge risk our portfolios have taken, with annualized standard deviations of 33.64% and 
26.97% respectively. Given the fact that our insider portfolios contain large amounts of firm-
specific risk, this comes as no surprise. Also, note the underperformance of the OSESX 
index compared to the OSEBX. Because our portfolio only consists of small cap stock, the 
outperformance of the index is remarkable.  
It is also worth noting that, based on the Sharpe-ratios, both our portfolios outperform the 
benchmark portfolios - taking into consideration that our portfolios are undiversified.  
In order to get a better picture of our portfolio performance, we turn to the other performance 
measurements. These measurements are more viable when considering whether to include 
the portfolio in a larger diversified portfolio, and because of this, we consider them more 
appropriate when measuring the performance of our portfolios. Based on the annualized rate 
of a Norwegian 10-year government bond – monthly publicized on Oslo Børs’ webpage17, 
we calculated the average annual risk-free rate to be 2,65%. 
Panel 8b: Three-month insider portfolio performance evaluation 
Panel 8c: Six-month insider portfolio performance evaluation 
In the following, we will use the measurements found using the 3 months insider portfolio 
and OSESX as a benchmark when explaining the results. 
As we can see, the betas are well below one. This is in line with betas of small-cap value 
firms elsewhere18, and suggest our portfolios’ returns are weakly related to fluctuations in 
                                                
17 http://www.norges-bank.no/Statistikk/Rentestatistikk/Statsobligasjoner-Rente-Daglige-noteringer/ 
18 http://www.dows.com/Publications/growth_versus_value_investing.htm 
Insider	  -­‐	  3	  months Beta M2 Treynor Adjusted	  Treynor Alpha AR IR Adjusted	  R2
OSEBX 0.44 7.83	  % 78.19	  % 67.02	  % 29.80	  % 0.91 0.69 5.87	  %
OSESX 0.54 13.77	  % 64.25	  % 61.64	  % 33.35	  % 1.03 0.96 6.41	  %
Insider	  -­‐	  6	  months Beta M2 Treynor Adjusted	  Treynor Alpha AR IR Adjusted	  R2
OSEBX 0.42 2.31	  % 46.89	  % 35.73	  % 15.06	  % 0.57 0.3 8.25 %
OSESX 0.56 9.01	  % 35.23	  % 32.61	  % 18.30	  % 0.71 0.67 10.80 %
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the general market’s returns. A beta of 0.54 implies that a 1% return in the market index, on 
average, is followed by a 0.54% return in the insider portfolio. We also note that betas are 
higher when comparing to the OSESX, suggesting that this is a more sensible benchmark 
that better track the portfolio.   
As mentioned, 𝑀!follows directly from the Sharpe ratios. 𝑀!of 13.77% means that our 
portfolio would have outperformed the benchmark by 13.77% on a yearly basis, given the 
same level of risk. However, as with the Sharpe ratio the 𝑀!inadequately captures the fact 
that our portfolios are undiversified.  
Turning to the Treynor-ratio, which is a measure of systematic risk-adjusted performance, 
we are better able to incorporate the low beta values of our portfolios. A Treynor of 78.19% 
means that our portfolio earned an excess of 78.19% over the risk-free rate, per unit of 
market risk. When comparing to the market using the adjusted Treynor, we find that our 
portfolio outperforms the market by 67.02%, per unit of market risk. This is a huge Treynor 
ratio compared to other funds, and it suggests that our portfolios could be a valuable addition 
to a diversified portfolio.  
Looking at Jensen’s alpha, we find a remarkable 𝛼 of 33.35%. This means that our fund has 
earned an excess of 33.35% annualized, compared to theoretically expected returns, 
calculated using the OSESX. In detecting whether the alpha is significant, we run regression 
tests in STATA where we regress the returns of our insider portfolios on the benchmark 
portfolios with both monthly and daily returns. All of the alphas have t-values in the 0.9-1.4 
region, so none of the alphas found are statistically larger than zero.  
Because our portfolios consist of so few stocks, it takes a huge active risk. Because of this, it 
is interesting to look at the AR ratio. We find an AR of 1.03, meaning that our portfolio 
earns an alpha of 1.03% per unit of active risk taken. This indicates that one could achieve 
substantial gains by including our portfolio in a diversified portfolio, where one could reduce 
systematic risk. 
We further find an IR of 0.96, which also indicate outperformance of the market. Because 
high beta portfolios would outperform lower beta portfolios on IR-ratio in bull markets, it is 
not an ideal tool when comparing performances across funds. We did however manage to 
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find a list of Norwegian funds’ IR the last 5 years. Even considering the low beta of our 
portfolio, our portfolio outperforms all other mutual funds based on the IR-ratio. 19 
The last value, R2, measures how active a fund is. More specifically, it measures how much 
of the variability in the returns of our portfolio is explained by the variability in the returns 
of the benchmark. R2 can range from 0 to 1, where R2 equal to 1 can be interpreted as a 
“perfect match”, as every movement of an asset can be explained based on the movement of 
its benchmark. Index funds strive to get as high R2 as possible. R2 for our portfolio relative 
to OSESX is 6.41%. This means that variability in the returns of OSEBX only explains 
6.41% of the variability in the returns of our portfolio, which again means that our portfolio 
is extremely active. In relative terms, very active funds seldom operate with R2s below 50%. 
Also here we see that OSESX yields higher a R2 than OSEBX, again indicating that this is a 
more appropriate benchmark. We also notice that the R2s are higher for the 6-months 
portfolio, something that is a result of the portfolio being more diversified.  
Because the firms in our portfolio have experience financial distress, they are more likely 
than the average firm to go bankrupt. This means that the problem of survivorship bias is 
very prominent in our portfolio. In order to gauge the potential survivorship bias, we looked 
up all the firms that were removed from our sample due to it having too few days in the 
event window. We found that the all the firm were removed due to either name change, stock 
change, or change of size/value category. We therefore conclude that our portfolio contains 
no survivorship bias. 
 
Results Discussion 
Somewhat surprisingly, given the large amount of undiversified risk, our portfolios 
outperform the market on all of our performance measures. However, despite the indications 
of outperformance, we are unable to find any statistical significant alphas. Moreover, all 
reported values are before accounting for transaction costs and bid-ask spreads. Because of 
the rebalance mechanism, maintaining this portfolio would require a lot of trading, 
                                                
19 http://digilib.lib.unipi.gr/dspace/bitstream/unipi/4699/1/Gkogkaki.pdf 
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something that would lead to high transaction costs. Because all stocks in our portfolio are 
small stocks, it is reasonable to assume that the bid-ask spread can be substantial. It is also 
worth noting that one could question the use of OSESX as a benchmark. We therefore 
conclude that we are unable to find any statistically significant evidence of outsiders being 
able to outperform the market. In relation to the market efficiency hypothesis, this means 
that we cannot conclude that the market does not hold semi-strong form.  
In relation to former studies, only Gelband’s study is comparable. The methods for choosing 
firms are similar, and so are the methods of rebalancing the portfolios. The differences are 
that Gelband chose his firms based on size and R&D expenditures, and he held a more 
diversified portfolio. Also Gelband found his portfolio to outperform the market on 
conventional measures, but he was unable to find any long-lasting abnormal returns.  
In general, we would not recommend this portfolio if investing only in this portfolio because 
the portfolio is not very diversified. We would rather suggest that this portfolio would be 
best combined in a larger diversified portfolio. Even though we find no statistical significant 
alphas, the evidence for outperformance is quite substantial. Even though the 
outperformance found in absence of transaction costs, we argue that one would be able to 
make a similar portfolio without significant transaction costs if one were to drop the 
rebalancing mechanism. One would therefore likely be able to increase ones risk-adjusted 
returns by including this portfolio in one’s total portfolio.  
 
9.9 Robustness Check Event Studies 
Because the assumption on identically distributed standard errors is questionable, we also 
calculate test-estimators that are non-parametric and thus not subjected to the assumptions of 
standard errors being i.d.d. Non-parematric tests can be used without assuming normality.  
There are many potential non-parametric tests to chose from, but we decide on using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. We chose this test over the sign test and the corrado rank test 
because these tests have been shown to have poor performance over longer event windows. 
It shuld however be mentioned that Brown and Warner (1980) showed that the signed-rank 
test had lower power than the t-test. This means that it more often than the t-test fail to 
discover abnormal returns. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test ranks the absolute differences in 
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abnormal returns, and then test whether the median of the abnormal returns is larger than 
zero. This way outliers have a much smaller impact. The only assumpions required is that 
data are paired and come from the same population, that each pair is chosen randomly and 
independent, and that data are measured on at least an ordinal scale. For a more thourough 
description, we refer to Wilcoxon (1945) and Siegel (1956). 
By looking at the abnormal return distributions and skewness and kurtiosis measures, we do 
find evidence of non-normal abnormal returns in most of our tests, meaning that the 
resiudals are not i.d.d. On further investigation, we found that the reason for this was 
outliers, which caused heavy tailes in the distribution of abnormal returns. MacKinlay 
advocates using non-parametric tests as a robustness check when this is the case. We use the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test as our non-parametric test, and report all p-values of both the the 
t-test and the Wilcoxon t-test in the appendix C. 
Using the Wilcoxon t-test, we make different interference in 12 out of the 140 tests we 
performed. In six of the cases, the Wilcoxon t-test reported significant abnormal returns 
when the t-test reported highly insignificant abnormal returns. In the other six cases, the 
interference went from borderline insignificant to significant, or significant to boarderline 
insignificant. The reason for the different interference is that the outliers are weighted less 
heavily. In the cases when the interference went from highly insignificant to significant, we 
found that the distributions had more extreme negative abnormal returns than extreme 
positive abnormal returns.  
In the cases with very different interference, the Wilcoxon t-test reported the overall 
abnormal returns to be significantly larger than zero in the three-month period in both the 
market model and the multifactor model. Analysing trade volume, the Wilcoxon t-test 
reported significant abnormal returns for medium absolute purchases in the three-month 
market model, for large relative purchases in the one-month multifactor model,  and for first 
purchases in the three-month multifactor model. Analysing insider position, the Wilcoxon t-
test reported significant abnormal returns to board members in the two-day model.  
In the cases with small changes in interference, the most notable change is that the Wilcoxon 
t-test did not find any abnormal returns for board members in the six-month periods. The 
Wilcoxon test also reported significant two-day abnormal returns following trades by board 
members.  
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Overall, the conclusions of our t-tests are confirmed, with the exception of board members.  
However, the performed robustness check yields valuable insights to the three-month 
abnormal  returns. It seems that in the average insider earn abnormal returns in a three-month 
window, but that there are many insiders that earn extreme abnormal returns, so that the 
average abnormal return earned by insiders is zero.  
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10. Weaknesses with our Models 
Risk Measurement 
We would argue that there are a couple of potential weaknesses with our multifactor model. 
This is because our calculation of the SMB and HML factors are questionable, and because 
we find SMB and HML portfolios to underperform compared to the market, which is the 
opposite of what we have seen in other countries. Additionally, we find somewhat surprising 
results when comparing our findings in the market model to the results in the multifactor 
model, which could imply that there is a misspecification in our multifactor model. Our 
calculation of the SMB and HML factors differs from Fama and Frenchs’ calculations in that 
they construct three different portfolios in each category, and then take the average of these 
three portfolios. Because Oslo Stock Exchange has a lot fewer stocks than are found in the 
US market, we had to take the averages across the top and bottom 33% percentiles. Another 
potential weakness is that we also included firms listed at Oslo Axess when calculating the 
SMB and HML portfolios. Because Axess mostly consists of smaller firms, and has 
performed better compared to the small cap firms on the main exchange, it biases the SMB 
effect.  
In addition, we do not control for momentum- and liquidity factors found in the Fama 
French five-factor model. This could potentially lead us to inadequately measure risk for the 
subsets consisting of small stocks. Illiquid stocks often trade on a premium, and not taking 
account for this premium could lead us to overestimate abnormal returns for these stocks.  
However, we chose to include the multifactor model in our results because we believe it still 
yield some good insight and a better measure of risk than the market model. Additionally, 
we have an indication that our measurements are at least reasonable correct considering the 
strong underperformance of OSESX compared to OSEBX. However, because of the 
uncertainty imposed by this, one should be especially careful when looking at the results in 
the “Firm Characteristics Section”. If our model inadequately captures the SMB and HML 
effects, it makes it harder to say whether the abnormal returns we found in fact is due to 
additional risk in these firms.  
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Survivorship Bias 
Our model is quite prone to any potential survivorship bias in the long term. This is because 
we exclude all firms that cease to exist during the event window. This likely inflates the 
estimates of abnormal returns in the long run because firms with extremely negative 
abnormal returns are removed. This could particularly be a problem in the “value” and 
“small-value” categories. This is because firms in these categories are especially prone to 
going bust. This means that the abnormal returns in these categories are possible more 
inflated compared to the abnormal returns in the other categories.  
 
Oslo Axess Listings 
In our dataset, we use the listings as of September 2014 when allocating stocks to Oslo 
Axess or Oslo Stock Exchange. This could potentially lead to some bias. It is likely that 
some of the stocks currently listed on the main exchange previously were listed on Oslo 
Axess. Because of this, the use of OSEBX as the market could potentially bias the 
calculation of the normal returns for such firms, and thus the calculation of abnormal returns. 
However, we only found this to happen five times in the whole sample. We therefore believe 
this bias to be very small, and because of this we will not investigate further. 
 
Outliers & Extreme Events 
Some events can have a huge impact on firm prices. This could potentially affect our results 
in two ways. The first way is that these few outliers could have a very large impact on our 
calculated abnormal returns, which could lead to a bias if there are more extreme events in 
one direction; For example if there is a merger two weeks after an insider purchase. The 
other potential reason is that having extreme events in the estimation window could bias the 
calculation of normal returns. For example, if some event in the estimation window leads to 
a CAAR of 20% over 1 month, it would cause normal returns in the event window to be 
inflated, which again would decrease our estimation of abnormal returns. We have however 
decided not to adjust for these. With the first example, we argue that these events should be 
included because it gives a more accurate picture of the actual abnormal returns earned by 
insiders. We also believe that it is correct to include firms with extreme events in our insider 
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portfolio, as these better reflect the return we would make. With the second example, we 
argue that as long as extreme events are distributed evenly in regards positive and negative 
signals, it would not lead to any biases in the CAARs. Moreover, removing them would 
possible impose another even bigger bias, namely selection bias. If there were any 
systematic patterns to the kind of firms being removed, it could greatly bias our results. We 
therefore chose to include all firms with extreme events.  
 
Unusual Returns in the Estimation Periods 
As mentioned, estimating normal returns in unordinary periods such as recessions and 
booms could cause the normal returns to be inaccurately measured. In our sample period, we 
include the 2011 Euro crisis. The crisis had a quite profound effect on OSEBX, causing it to 
drop by almost 30% from the top in early April 2011 to the bottom in mid May 2011. 
However, we chose to include this period for two reasons. The first reason is that it gives us 
a lot more observations, which allows us to a greater extent investigate abnormal returns 
across small subsets. The other reason is that we use estimation windows consisting of about 
10 months of daily returns. Seeing as this drop occurred in less than 2 months, we argue that 
the effect on the normal returns calculation is rather small.  
 
Interference with Clustering  
One weakness with our model over the 1, 3 and 6 months horizons is event clustering. Event 
clustering is when event windows of the included securities in the analysis overlap. This 
renders the independence assumption for abnormal returns incorrect because event clustering 
could induce covariance in abnormal returns across securities. On other words, one 
macroeconomic event at time t could affect all the abnormal returns of firms with date t in 
their event windows. This is particularly a problem when estimating abnormal returns over 
longer horizons. Event clustering could potentially lead to two things. The first thing is that 
it could bias the estimated CAARs. However, as long as these events are randomly 
distributed, it will not lead to a bias on average. Because it is reasonable to assume that this 
is the case, we should not worry about this given our large sample window. The biggest 
problem is that event clustering could bias the standard deviation estimate downward 
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because there is less variability in the abnormal returns across firms. This would lead to 
inflated test statistics, which could cause us to make wrong interference. In other words, it 
could cause us to wrongfully reject the null hypothesis, also known as a type 2 error. This 
effect is particularly pronounced when the sample selection is homogeneous, and when 
events tend to happen in the same period. On average, our sample consists of securities from 
a multitude of industries, which means that they are rather heterogeneous. However, this 
could be a problem in our subsamples where we examine CAARs across firm characteristics. 
However, our sample is quite prone to the second effect. Because insiders are inhibited from 
trading two months prior to earnings reports, and because earnings reports tend to come in 
the same period, it could mean that on average insider trading across all firms is clustered 
around the 8 months where insider trading is legal.  
According to MacKinlay (1997), there are generally two ways of accommodating clustering. 
One is to use the Jensens-alpha approach where one aggregates abnormal returns into a 
portfolio, and then apply the analysis to the portfolio. This will address the problems because 
the variability of the portfolio returns will be influenced by the cross-correlation in the data.  
The other approach is to analyze the abnormal returns without aggregation. Khotari and 
Warner further explore ways of dealing with clustering in their 2006 paper.  
In our model, we do not account for clustering. This is because it is a quite complicated 
process. The reader should also note that event clustering does not affect any of our 
conclusions regarding our insider portfolio. It is also worth to mentioning a couple of points 
that reduce the impact clustering have on our results. The first is that the problem of 
clustering is reduced when controlling for firm characteristics such as size and PB-values. 
We can see that some of our interference changes when using the multifactor model due to 
significant increases in standard errors. This suggests that the multifactor model takes 
clustering more into account. Moreover, Khotari and Warner (2006) points out that adjusting 
for clustering is critical with event windows that span over a year, but not as critical for 
shorter time periods. Khotari and Warner find that using the market model on an 11 day 
window, the results on specification is not profoundly altered in the event of clustering. They 
further find that goodness of fit test typically fail to detect misspecification in the model. 
However, we still urge the reader bear in mind the potential bias arising from clustering 
when reading our results.  
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Thin Trading 
Another potential problem with event studies is thin trading. Thin trading simply means that 
stocks are seldom traded. As mentioned, this can lead to biases when calculating the beta, 
and thus normal returns and abnormal returns. Scholes and Williams (1997) found the beta 
of thinly traded securities to be underestimated by approximately 10%-20%. This would 
again inflate abnormal returns. On average, thin trading should not pose a problem to our 
model. It may however lead to a positive bias when estimating abnormal returns for small 
cap stocks.  
 
Low Power of Long Horizon Tests 
In their 2006 working paper, Khotari and Warner investigate the effect time-horizon has on 
power in event studies. Power is defined as the inability of a model to detect abnormal 
performance when it really exists. Using parameters of 10% and a sample size of 100 
securities, they found the power of a one month event-window to be 99%, and the power of a 
six month event window to be 40%. Even for a sample size of 200 securities, they only 
found the power to be a little less than 70%. In other words, the model did not detect the 10 
% abnormal returns in 40% of the samples. This is something that potentially could explain 
why our models fail to detect long term abnormal returns, especially in the subsamples, 
where we have fewer observations. 
 
Inappropriate Choice of Benchmark in Regards to the Insider Portfolio and 
Survivorship Bias 
Because of the firms in our insider portfolio likely differs from the stocks on OSESX in that 
our stocks are more risky, it is possible that OSESX makes for a poor benchmark. Because 
more risky stocks have higher expected returns, it means that part of the alphas found using 
the OSESX as an index could in fact be compensation for risk.  A better idea would be to use 
a benchmark with a more similar risk profile. Because there are no indices of small-cap 
value firms on Oslo Stock Exchange, one potential idea would be to create a portfolio 
consisting of similar stocks and use this as a benchmark.  
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11. Proposition to Further Studies 
In our research, we have made a couple of discoveries that we have not seen investigated in 
other studies. The first one is the strong subsequent performance in firms where insiders 
make their first purchase. It would be exciting to see whether the same relationship exists 
across countries.  
Furthermore, to our knowledge, we are the first ones to investigate the relationship between 
short-term market reactions and actual long-term abnormal returns. All in all, the market 
seems to be rational in their reactions. We did however discover some cases where short-
term reactions differed from what one would expect given long-term performance. It would 
be interesting to further investigate whether this in fact is a market anomaly, or if there are 
some rational explanations.  
It is possible that our model fails to adequately capture risks. Given the weaknesses 
mentioned in regards to the SMB and HML portfolio, it would also be interesting to more 
accurately control for these factors. One idea would be to assign stocks on a half-yearly 
basis. It would also be interesting to control for liquidity and momentum. Controlling for 
these additional risk factors would allow for making better interference.  
As mentioned in the weakness section, our model does not take into account potential event 
clustering. This possibly inflates our standard errors, and makes our model more prone to 
make type two errors. It would therefore be of interest to see whether the interferences we 
made holds when using other methods.  
In regards to our insider portfolio, there are many potential ways to build on our results. One 
could for example try to construct portfolios based on different insider trade characteristics. 
One idea would be to include trade volume or insider type when constructing the insider 
portfolio. Another possibility would be to explore different holding periods. Yet another 
possibility would be to impose different rules in the insider portfolio. One could be to 
impose a maximum weight rule in order to reduce risk, and another could be to come up with 
a rule to reduce the number of transactions. As mentioned, having an equal weighted 
portfolio at all times imposes a lot of transaction costs. It would be interesting to see how 
well a less trading intensive strategy would do, as it would be much easier to estimate the 
transaction costs. It would especially be interesting to see whether our portfolio would 
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generate a significant alpha including transaction costs. Another way to improve on our 
studies would be to find a more appropriate benchmark. This would give more credibility to 
any potential alphas found.  
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12. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate abnormal returns made by insiders on Oslo Børs in both the 
short run and the long in the 01.01.2010-15.08.2014 period. We also analysed insider returns 
across insider positions, trade volume, market cap, and price-to-book values. These analyses 
were performed using an event-study methodology with both the market model and the 
multifactor model to calculate abnormal returns. Using the most profitable insider trades, we 
then developed an insider based strategy and analysed its performance using a portfolio-
mimicking method.  
In our short-run analysis, we looked at the two day market reaction to insider trades. We 
found the two day abnormal return across all insider trades to be 0.61%. Looking across firm 
characteristics, we found the market to react to trades in all subsets, with the strongest 
reaction to trades in small cap firms and growth firms, followed by value firms. Looking at 
trade size, we found the market to react to all trade volumes, with the exception of small 
absolute trades. The size of the market reaction increases as trade volume increase, with the 
biggest reaction following large relative trades. Looking at insider position, we found 
significant market reactions to trades by managers, others, and board members using a non-
parametric test. The strongest reaction followed trades by managers. Because of confounding 
factors, we used a multiple regression analysis to better find the source of the market 
reaction. We found that when controlling for all factors, we found the greatest source of 
market reaction to be insider trades made by managers, and insider trades in value firms.  
These results suggest that the market is not strong-form efficient, and that there are 
informational asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. We also conclude that insider 
trades make the market more efficient, because insider information is incorporated into the 
market prices.  
We also did an analysis on abnormal returns when the date of the insider trade and the date 
of the announcement of the insider trade differed. We found a highly significant abnormal 
return of 1 percent on the day of the insider trade when the trade had yet to be announced, 
suggesting that there are market participants who are able to immediately discover insider 
trades as they take place.  
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In our long-term analysis, we wanted to see whether insiders were able to better predict 
future performance than the market. We found that insiders on average earn a one month 
cumulative abnormal returns of 1.73% using the market model, and 3.03% using the 
multifactor model. However, these abnormal returns disappear when looking at a 3-month 
and 6-month window. These results suggest that on average, insiders are unable to predict 
long term firm performance. We also looked one-month abnormal returns following insider 
sales, and found no evidence that insiders on average earned any abnormal returns. 
However, we did find evidence of abnormal returns in certain subsets. Notably, insiders in 
small firms earned statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of 5.88% in the three 
months following the insider trades. Moreover, insiders in value firms earned statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns of 6.30 % in the three-month window, and 6.02% in 
the six-month window. These finds are in line with former studies and the informational 
asymmetry hypothesis. We also found evidence of extremely large abnormal returns in 
small, value firms. The abnormal returns persisted in all the periods investigated, and are 
likely a result of large informational asymmetries and financial distress. 
When looking at insider positions, we found that managers and board members earn 
statistically significant abnormal returns in the month following insider trades. However, at 
longer horizons we only find evidence for abnormal returns in the managers and board 
members. In the one-month perspective managers earns the highest abnormal returns, while 
board members earn the highest abnormal returns in the three- and six-month perspective. 
We argue that the reason for this is that board members have a better idea of the firm 
direction, and are not subjected to as much scrutiny as top management.  
We also looked at trade size. When looking at absolute trade size, we found significant 
returns in a one- month perspective for medium and large trades. When looking at relative 
sizes, we found evidence for large abnormal returns in the three- and six-months periods 
following the large insider trades. We also found that the insiders making their first insider 
purchases tend to earn large significant abnormal returns in a one-month perspective. 
Finally, we constructed an insider portfolio with small, value firms using the portfolio 
mimicking method, and measured its’ performance. Our analysis indicates that our portfolio 
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outperformed the markets, but we did not find any statistically significant alphas, meaning 
that we conclude that markets are at least semi-strong efficient.  
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
OSEBX	  Return 18.35	  % -­‐12.46	  % 15.36	  % 23.59	  %
Purchase 354 428 257 330 190
Sale 114 77 62 121 65
Purchase-­‐to-­‐Sale	  Ratio 3.1 5.6 4.1 2.7 2.9
Month	  (2010-­‐2013) Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug Sep Okt Nov Des
Purchases 44 184 141 78 200 134 41 144 125 75 112 91
%	  of	  total	  #	  Purchases 3.2	  % 13.4	  % 10.3	  % 5.7	  % 14.6	  % 9.8	  % 3.0	  % 10.5	  % 9.1	  % 5.5	  % 8.2	  % 6.6	  %
Sales 21 55 49 7 37 19 12 20 29 23 77 25
%	  of	  total	  #	  Sales 5.6	  % 14.7	  % 13.1	  % 1.9	  % 9.9	  % 5.1	  % 3.2	  % 5.3	  % 7.8	  % 6.1	  % 20.6	  % 6.7	  %
Purchase-­‐to-­‐Sale	  Ratio 2.10 3.35 2.88 11.14 5.41 7.05 3.42 7.20 4.31 3.26 1.45 3.64
14. Appendix 
Appendix A – Descriptive Statistics 
 
A1: Insider transactions by year 
 
 
 
 
 
A2: Insider Transactions by month 
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Publ.Date Date Ticker Position Action Price Value.In.NOK Change Holdings.after.trade
12.05.2010 11.05.2010 GSF CEO BUY 17 178500 18	  % 60000
12.05.2010 11.05.2010 ASC primary	  insider BUY 6.7 2680000 1	  % 35400000
12.05.2010 11.05.2010 ASC primary	  insider BUY 6.7 1005000 26	  % 575000
12.05.2010 11.05.2010 ASC chairman BUY 6.7 670000 5	  % 2090934
12.05.2010 11.05.2010 ASC board	  member BUY 6.7 268000 67	  % 60000
12.05.2010 11.05.2010 REC SVP	  Technology	  &	  CTO SELL 18.21 206392 -­‐2	  % 492023
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 SPOG related	  to	  Morten	  André	  Yttreeide BUY 33 99000 100	  % 3000
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 NORH main	  shareholder BUY 1.97 82740 0	  % 12559126
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 HRG managing	  director BUY 5.3 503453 8	  % 1119040
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 HRG board	  member BUY 5.3 53000 50	  % 20000
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 HRG board	  member BUY 5.33 266500 100	  % 50000
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 AFG related	  to	  Tore	  Thorstensen,	  primary	  insiderBUY 38.5 3850000 37	  % 272000
13.05.2010 12.05.2010 AKBM controller BUY 1.63 40750 100	  % 25000
14.05.2010 13.05.2010 STB board	  member SELL 42.5 54825 -­‐100	  % 0
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 TSU board	  member	  and	  vice	  president	  business	  	  developmentBUY 0.27 61470 7	  % 3450924
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 DAT chairman BUY 8.4 210000 30	  % 84684
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 DAT CFO BUY 8.4 84000 14	  % 70000
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 DAT CTO BUY 8.4 84000 14	  % 71596
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 DAT group	  controller BUY 8.4 84000 100	  % 10000
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 EKO related	  to	  Nora	  F.	  Larssen,	  board	  memberBUY 125.25 142323830 21	  % 5455194
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 KOM related	  to	  Peter	  A.	  Ruzicka	  and	  Nils	  Selte,	  board	  membersBUY 37 2264696 1	  % 9482053
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 HEX CFO BUY 6.93 6930 100	  % 1000
17.05.2010 14.05.2010 DNO chairman SELL 8.28 16550000 -­‐6	  % 30102504
19.05.2010 18.05.2010 AKBM board	  member BUY 1.61 201250 100	  % 125000
19.05.2010 18.05.2010 MHG senior	  accounting	  manager SELL 5.85 35100 -­‐51	  % 5756
20.05.2010 19.05.2010 APP board	  member BUY 2.5 1265000 54	  % 942694
20.05.2010 19.05.2010 KOM related	  to	  Peter	  A.	  Ruzicka	  and	  Nils	  Selte,	  board	  membersBUY 37 41403 0	  % 9482053
20.05.2010 19.05.2010 GYL chairman BUY 280 25200 0	  % 1997191
20.05.2010 19.05.2010 NORTH chairman BUY 20.4 102000 0	  % 1341610
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 STB related	  to	  Annika	  Lundius,	  board	  memberBUY 39.2 101920 100	  % 2600
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 MORG primary	  insider BUY 185 34225 8	  % 2185
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 GSF related	  to	  Per	  Grieg,	  chairman BUY 18.1 905000 0	  % 48558010
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 HNA CEO BUY 62.5 75000 8	  % 15756
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 ASD chairman BUY 27.61 138031 40	  % 12500
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 ASD CEO BUY 27.07 93409 16	  % 22015
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 ASD group	  finance	  director BUY 27.5 275000 20	  % 50375
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 ASD non-­‐executive	  director BUY 27.28 83213 100	  % 3050
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 SADG risk	  manager SELL 120 20520 -­‐5	  % 3462
21.05.2010 20.05.2010 DNBNOR employee	  elected	  board	  member SELL 62.1 62100 -­‐87	  % 151
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 TOM SVP	  technology BUY 25.2 151200 20	  % 29600
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 TFSO chairman BUY 6.99 27960 4	  % 105250
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 HNA CEO BUY 59 47200 5	  % 16556
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 ASD non-­‐executive	  director BUY 27 270000 67	  % 15000
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 GSF related	  to	  Per	  Grieg,	  chairman BUY 17.04 851795 0	  % 48608010
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 TFSO CEO BUY 6.99 48930 0	  % 2857649
24.05.2010 21.05.2010 SVEG chairman BUY 42.67 640050 68	  % 22200
26.05.2010 25.05.2010 SCH EVP BUY 124.26 62130 6	  % 8157
26.05.2010 25.05.2010 ASC board	  member BUY 5.9 118000 50	  % 40000
26.05.2010 25.05.2010 ODF primary	  insider BUY 38.62 1931000 31	  % 163900
26.05.2010 25.05.2010 HNA board	  member BUY 57.6 46080 100	  % 800
26.05.2010 25.05.2010 HNB board	  member BUY 55.5 11100 100	  % 200
26.05.2010 25.05.2010 ASD non-­‐executive	  director BUY 26 130000 25	  % 20000
27.05.2010 26.05.2010 COMROD chairman BUY 12.7 3248089 4	  % 5787278
27.05.2010 26.05.2010 TSU board	  member	  and	  vice	  president	  business	  developmentBUY 0.25 187660 18	  % 4214924
 
A3: Example of insider data 
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Appendix B: Tests for differences in means 
In the following, we will present the p-values of the two-sided t-tests that test whether 
differences between groups are statistically different. Differences that are found significant 
at a 5% level using a one-sided t-test are marked with a star (*).Significant values at a 5% 
level are bold and underlined. 
	   	   	  
	  B1: Market Model 2 days 	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.056	   0.106	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.493	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.286	   0.688	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.112	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.698	   0.499	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.747	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.473	   0.743	   0.124	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.644	   0.512	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.215	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	  
Board	  
Member	  
Top	  
Management	   Other	  
Primary	  
Insider	  
Manager	   0.090*	   0.019	   0.120	   0.163	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.849	   0.522	   0.791	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.274	   0.617	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.755	  
 
 
 
 
 
 114 
B2: Market Model 1 Month 	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.000	   0.000	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.000	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.001	   0.002	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.968	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.252	   0.936	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.167	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.004	   0.398	   0.016	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.040	   0.475	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.143	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	   Board	  Member	   Top	  Management	   Other	   Primary	  Insider	  
Manager	   0.51	   0.395	   0.043	   0.019	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.901	   0.328	   0.159	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.361	   0.169	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.487	  
	  
B3: Multifactor Model 1 Month 	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.219	   0.000	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.238	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.574	   0.011	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.321	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.389	   0.245	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.531	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.205	   0.580	   0.971	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.070*	   0.261	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.710	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	   Board	  Member	   Top	  Management	   Other	   Primary	  Insider	  
Manager	   0.390	   0.665	   0.926	   0.004	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.114	   0.539	   0.210	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.736	   0.0164	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.105	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B4: Market Model 3 Months 	  	   	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.018	   0.002	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.639	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.009	   0.011	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.640	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.345	   0.386	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.899	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.052*	   0.219	   0.025	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.380	   0.346	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.112	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	   Board	  Member	   Top	  Management	   Other	   Primary	  Insider	  
Manager	   0.778	   0.449	   0.024	   0.082*	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.334	   0.016	   0.051*	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.159	   0.459	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.400	  
 
B5: Multifactor Model 3 Months 	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.014	   0.002	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.869	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.007	   0.108	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.321	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.336	   0.391	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.74	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.190	   0.529	   0.005	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.340	   0.871	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.064*	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	   Board	  Member	   Top	  Management	   Other	   Primary	  Insider	  
Manager	   0.524	   0.018	   0.001	   0.006	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.035	   0.013	   0.022	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.713	   0.889	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.808	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B7: Multifactor Model 6 Months 	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.005	   0.115	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.043	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.000	   0.089*	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.020	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Trade	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.079*	   0.053*	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.739	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Trade	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.002	   0.050	   0.000	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.230	   0.054*	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.064*	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	   Board	  Member	   Top	  Management	   Other	   Primary	  Insider	  
Manager	   0.913	   0.062*	   0.002	   0.079*	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.050	   0.001	   0.063*	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.628	   0.803	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.384	  
 
B6: Market Model 6 Months 	  	   	  	  
Firm	  Size	   Midcap	   Largecap	   	  	   	  	  
Smallcap	  	   0.004	   0.067*	   	  	   	  	  
Midcap	   	  	   0.061*	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
BM-­‐Ratio	   MidBM	   Growth	   	  	   	  	  
Value	  	   0.000	   0.146	   	  	   	  	  
MidBM	   	  	   0.012	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Absolute	  Trade	  Volume	   Medium	   Large	   	  	   	  	  
Small	   0.024	   0.021	   	  	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   0.873	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Relative	  Trade	  Volume	   First	   Medium	   Large	   	  	  
Small	   0.001	   0.051*	   0.000	   	  	  
First	   	  	   0.174	   0.621	   	  	  
Medium	   	  	   	  	   0.058*	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Insider	  Position	   Board	  Member	   Top	  Management	   Other	   Primary	  Insider	  
Manager	   0.739	   0.122	   0.003	   0.334	  
Board	  Member	   	  	   0.062*	   0.001	   0.210	  
Top	  Management	   	  	   	  	   0.285	   0.671	  
Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.154	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Firm	  Category
t-­‐test	  p	  >	  |t| All	  Trades Smallcap Midcap Largecap Value MidBM Growth	   Small	  Value
MM	  2	  days 0.000 0.001 0.076* 0.000 0.011 0.030 0.001 0.253
MM	  1	  Month 0.000 0.000 0.727 0.366 0.000 0.480 0.499 0.000
MM	  3	  Months 0.361 0.001 0.521 0.686 0.001 0.429 0.783 0.000
MM	  6	  Months 0.603 0.152 0.001 0.202 0.041 0.000 0.931 0.000
MF	  1	  Month 0.002 0.000 0.163 0.562 0.000 0.102 0.199 0.000
MF	  3	  Months 0.191 0.001 0.647 0.573 0.002 0.363 0.604 0.000
MF	  6	  Months 0.206 0.248 0.001 0.212 0.042 0.000 0.646 0.000
Wilcoxon	  p	  >	  |z| All	  Trades Smallcap Midcap Largecap Value MidBM Growth	   Small	  Value
MM	  2	  days 0.000 0.001 0.037 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.195
MM	  1	  Month 0.001 0.000 0.892 0.846 0.000 0.549 0.751 0.000
MM	  3	  Months 0.010 0.004 0.608 0.076 0.000 0.842 0.634 0.000
MM	  6	  Months 0.706 0.198 0.064 0.246 0.013 0.000 0.749 0.000
MF	  1	  Month 0.000 0.000 0.519 0.663 0.000 0.269 0.337 0.000
MF	  3	  Months 0.014 0.002 0.788 0.944 0.002 0.703 0.825 0.000
MF	  6	  Months 0.354 0.275 0.043 0.295 0.020 0.000 0.530 0.000
Trade	  Volume
t-­‐test	  p	  >	  |t| All	  Trades Small	  Absolute Medium	  Absolute Large	  Absolute Small	  Relative Medium	  Relative Large	  Relative First	  Purchase
MM	  2	  days 0.000 0.253 0.023 0.000 0.011 0.032 0.008 0.069*
MM	  1	  Month 0.000 0.288 0.001 0.067* 0.606 0.241 0.003 0.001
MM	  3	  Months 0.361 0.642 0.314 0.471 0.369 0.450 0.040 0.077*
MM	  6	  Months 0.603 0.015 0.689 0.832 0.000 0.924 0.011 0.060
MF	  1	  Month 0.002 0.204 0.003 0.034 0.112 0.163 0.293 0.010
MF	  3	  Months 0.191 0.737 0.318 0.293 0.444 0.811 0.007 0.240
MF	  6	  Months 0.206 0.022 0.985 0.566 0.000 0.879 0.017 0.126
Wilcoxon	  p	  >	  |z| All	  Trades Small	  Absolute Medium	  Absolute Large	  Absolute Small	  Relative Medium	  Relative Large	  Relative First	  Purchase
MM	  2	  days 0.000 0.081 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.014 0.001
MM	  1	  Month 0.001 0.505 0.001 0.107 0.441 0.306 0.002 0.003
MM	  3	  Months 0.010 0.920 0.044 0.055 0.925 0.268 0.016 0.008
MM	  6	  Months 0.706 0.029 0.197 0.703 0.010 0.690 0.017 0.340
MF	  1	  Month 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.028 0.137 0.187 0.001 0.003
MF	  3	  Months 0.014 0.908 0.099 0.057 0.745 0.489 0.009 0.018
MF	  6	  Months 0.354 0.037 0.366 0.372 0.002 0.785 0.027 0.377
Insider	  Position
t-­‐test	  p	  >	  |t| All	  Trades Top	  Management Board	  Members Managers Primary	  Insiders Others
MM	  2	  days 0.000 0.341 0.370 0.000 0.202 0.002
MM	  1	  Month 0.000 0.09* 0.077* 0.001 0.972 0.249
MM	  3	  Months 0.361 0.315 0.001 0.003 0.904 0.346
MM	  6	  Months 0.603 0.527 0.034 0.097 0.934 0.005
MF	  1	  Month 0.002 0.007 0.092* 0.001 0.756 0.107
MF	  3	  Months 0.191 0.617 0.028 0.001 0.477 0.232
MF	  6	  Months 0.206 0.260 0.066* 0.094* 0.389 0.002
Wilcoxon	  p	  >	  |z| All	  Trades Top	  Management Board	  Members Managers Primary	  Insiders Others
MM	  2	  days 0.000 0.180 0.040 0.000 0.518 0.002
MM	  1	  Month 0.001 0.014 0.125 0.008 0.630 0.223
MM	  3	  Months 0.010 0.677 0.001 0.024 0.551 0.811
MM	  6	  Months 0.706 0.370 0.082 0.034 0.780 0.010
MF	  1	  Month 0.000 0.003 0.108 0.005 0.811 0.111
MF	  3	  Months 0.014 0.851 0.001 0.010 0.441 0.872
MF	  6	  Months 0.354 0.319 0.120 0.033 0.351 0.006
Appendix C: Non-parametric test output 
In the following panel, we report the p-values of both the t-test and the Wilcoxon ranked 
sign test. The p-values are reported by category, and values found significant at a 5% 
significance level using a one-sided t-test are marked with a star (*). Significant values at a 
5% level are bold and underlined. The gray shades indicate where the two tests make 
different interference. Heavy shading indicates a strong difference in interference, and weak 
shade indicates a small difference. Red p-values indicate negative coefficients. We refer to 
the market model as MM and the multifactor model as MF.  
C1: P-values parametric and non-parametric tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
